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Part One 
Why Another CED Statement  
On Health Care?
Four years ago, the Committee for Economic Development 
issued a statement entitled A New Vision For Health Care: A 
Leadership Role for Business.  That statement presented four 
major recommendations for large businesses and another four 
for large businesses in conjunction with government (along 
with others addressed directly to government).  The state-
ment decried “…the closely entangled problems of escalating 
costs, uneven and poor quality, and inadequate access,” and 
stated that the “recommendations…, taken together, would 
address these problems and improve the system’s efficiency and 
equity… This report is a call to action.  We challenge our own 
members, the business community at large, public policymak-
ers, and other sectors of society to join us in taking the difficult 
steps necessary to create an efficient system that will provide 
access to high-quality health care for all Americans.”1
Although we continue to believe that the recommendations in 
that statement are sound, and though data on developments in 
the succeeding four years are scarce, we fear that little progress 
has been made since we released that report.  The number of 
Americans with employer-sponsored health insurance, and the 
number of employers who offer health coverage, have contin-
ued to decline.†
The nation’s health-care problems are becoming critical, if they 
are not so already.  Rising health costs are straining both public 
and private budgets, and are making many American busi-
nesses less competitive.  Moreover, the public is ill-served by 
the failure to deliver the care needed by rich and poor alike.
We have concluded that even more-aggressive public-policy 
action is needed before the damage to our health-care sys-
tem becomes even more costly to repair.  This statement will 
explain why.
Performance Standards For A Nation’s 
Health-care System
What are the reasonable standards by which to judge the over-
all performance of a health-care system?  The usual answer in 
health policy circles is “cost, quality and access.”
“Cost” is the usual shorthand term for health-care expendi-
tures – that is, the amount a society spends on health care, 
measured either per capita or as a percent of GDP.  Why 
should we care what percent of our GDP we spend on health 
care?  First, we care about affordability.  It makes sense that an 
affluent society, as it grows still more affluent, would choose 
to devote some (or even much) of its extra income toward 
its health.2  But beyond the question of whether cost growth 
represents improved care, or rather is merely a rear-guard ac-
tion against the ill effects of unhealthy lifestyles, does health 
insurance and health care remain within reach for families of 
moderate means?  Can health-insurance premiums fit within 
the total compensation that is affordable by the employers of 
most or all people?  In these terms, the cost as a percentage of 
the GDP correlates with the share of people’s earning power.  
Second, national health expenditures (NHE) as a percent 
of GDP matter because now more than 60 percent of NHE 
passes through public-sector budgets (including the tax exclu-
sions for employer-paid health benefits, and insurance costs 
for public employees) and is therefore a drain on public-sector 
finances, leading to higher deficits or taxes, and crowding out 
other vital public services.  If health insurance is not afford-
able to people with low incomes, is there room in public-sector 
budgets for subsidies for their purchases of health insurance?  
Third, is the trajectory of health expenditures sustainable 
– that is, growing no faster than the GDP, or not much faster 
than affordable total compensation of employees?
“Quality” has many meanings.  Americans like to think that we 
have the highest quality health care in the world.  That may be 
true in the sense of the most advanced medical technologies 
for well-insured people.  However, other concepts of quality 
have been gaining attention lately.  How likely are Americans 
to receive “recommended” care – that is, those interventions 
that are well supported by clinical evidence and are known to 
benefit patients?  How likely are patients with serious chronic 
conditions to get the care they need?  How likely are they to 
get appropriate care – that is, care of the kind and in just the 
amount that confers maximum benefit, but no more? Inappro-
priate care is the medical term for what is often called “unneces-
† A more detailed evaluation of the evidence is included later in this statement.  
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sary care.”  How many are in the hospital unnecessarily, or for 
a condition that could have been prevented by less costly and 
less invasive outpatient care?  How many operations do people 
have that are not the best for their health?  Is American medi-
cal care safe?  How often is the wrong limb amputated?  How 
likely are Americans to die or suffer from errors in hospitals 
or in medications?  Finally, is quality, so defined, improving as 
a consequence of better organization of care, or is it suffering 
due to the increasing fragmentation of care delivery?
“Access” is shorthand for people’s ability to obtain appropriate 
care.  This has a financial component and a delivery system 
component.  The financial component generally refers to 
having health insurance whose coverage makes care reason-
ably affordable to people who need it, and whose provisions, 
like coinsurance and deductibles, do not deter people from 
obtaining care that is important for their health.  The delivery 
system component refers to having geographic and transporta-
tion access to a facility and to professionals who will provide 
appropriate care.
Financial access is usually evaluated in terms of the number of 
people who do not have health insurance – which is argu-
ably the most important single criterion of success.  It is in 
everyone’s interest that everyone has health insurance.  The 
uninsured go without needed care.  What care they get is often 
in emergency rooms, which is very costly and lacking in the 
continuity of care that is important for patients with chronic 
conditions.  Some uninsured adults with chronic conditions 
become disabled and end up on public programs, which could 
have been avoided if they had had proper care.  The lack of 
health insurance causes financial hardship and loss of savings, 
leading in the extreme to medical bankruptcies.3  Uninsured 
people place financial burdens on hospitals that are required 
by law to treat people in urgent need of care and without 
insurance.  This burden is shifted to those who do have health 
insurance, raising the cost of insurance for them.  In addition, 
the whole problem of determination of eligibility for public 
programs, credit and collection leads to large administrative 
costs.  Finally, doctors and hospitals do provide substantial 
amounts of charity or free or “uncompensated” care, and they 
argue that they must be protected from competition because 
they are disadvantaged by the burden of uninsured patients.  
Without this burden, which could be lifted by universal cover-
age, unleashed competitive market forces could drive greater 
efficiency without the unintended side effect of further deny-
ing uninsured people access to care.
Does The American Health-care System 
Meet These Standards?
For all of this nation’s wealth and power, our health-care sys-
tem demonstrably fails to meet these basic criteria.
On the question of cost, the price of an average family insur-
ance policy, $13,382 per year for a family of four in 2006, can 
be weighed against typical family earning power.4  The median 
household income in the United States in 2006, with employer 
costs of health insurance included, is roughly $48,250.5  A 
family health-insurance premium in 2006 costs more than a 
quarter of the earning power of the median household.  NHE 
in 2006 are about 16 percent of the GDP.6  This means that 
government health outlays (and the revenue cost of tax exclu-
sions) at all levels come to about 10 percent of GDP.  In 2004, 
all government receipts at federal, state and local levels came to 
about 30 percent of GDP.  Thus, the cost of health care looms 
large in public finances, even before the postwar baby boom 
starts retiring into Medicare eligibility.  Once the baby-boom 
generation begins to retire, public health-care costs will grow 
even faster.  For the past 25 years, NHE have been growing 
about 2.5 percentage points a year faster than GDP.  If these 
rates continue to 2030, NHE will reach about 28 percent of 
GDP.  If health outlays are not unbearable today, they soon 
will be.  Health-insurance purchasers, public and private, 
have been unable to hold their shares of NHE to sustainable 
growth rates.  
On the matter of quality, the Institute of Medicine of the 
National Academy of Sciences (IOM) finds that our health-
care quality leaves much to be desired.  The IOM accepted 
estimates that between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each 
year in hospitals from medical errors.7  A recent IOM report 
estimated that at least 1.5 million Americans are sickened, 
injured or killed each year by errors in prescribing, dispensing 
and taking medications.8  Drug errors cause at least 400,000 
preventable injuries and deaths in hospitals each year, more 
than 800,000 in nursing homes and facilities for the elderly, 
and 530,000 among Medicare recipients treated in outpatient 
clinics.  A 2003 study by RAND asked how much of the 
care called for under generally accepted standards of medical 
practice people are actually receiving, and found the answer 
was about 55 percent.9  Adoption of technologies to improve 
this situation has been very slow.10  RAND studies also have 
documented a great deal of overuse.  Dartmouth studies have 
shown wide geographic variations in medical practices such as 
frequency of hospitalizations and surgery per capita (adjusted 
for differences in the characteristics of the different popula-
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tions), suggesting some people are getting too much (that is, 
unnecessary or unhelpful) care, and others too little (or some 
combination).  
Still, it is on the score of access that the failure of our health-
care system may be most serious.  In 2005, according to the 
August 2006 Census Bureau report, 46.6 million Ameri-
cans were without health insurance, up from 39.6 million in 
2000.11  The IOM estimates that the uninsured have a 25 
percent higher risk of dying than similar people with health 
insurance.12  This situation is clearly contrary to our nation’s 
values.  Nobody says that people should suffer and die for lack 
of ability to pay.  We have created, in this country, numerous 
public programs that are patches on the system to compensate 
for lack of health insurance: EMTALA, the law requiring 
hospitals to care for uninsured people; disproportionate share 
payments by the federal government to hospitals in areas 
that have a disproportionate share of uninsured; Medicaid; 
the State Children’s Health Insurance Program; Ryan White 
for AIDS; Maternal and Child Health; and so on.  It would 
be a lot simpler – and if all costs were considered, including 
those from disability and suffering, a lot cheaper – simply to 
make sure everybody had at least financial access to appropri-
ate care.  As just one indication of the potential savings from 
having coverage and receiving sound primary care, the New 
York Times recently reported that a hospital in Texas found 
that it could actually save money by providing free outpatient 
care to diabetics, thus obviating their need for more expensive 
emergency hospitalization which the hospital was obligated to 
provide without reimbursement.13
Is universal coverage a utopian, unrealistic or socialistic dream, 
or is it a practical, economically and morally compelling goal 
for our society?  Most of the other advanced democracies 
have achieved it, and we could do so too – with a system that 
is built on our own history, and accords with our own values.  
“Universal coverage” is not likely to achieve 100 percent enroll-
ment of the population in health plans.  There will always be 
people whose lifestyle does not fit with enrolling in a health 
plan, and there must always be public provider systems of last 
resort to care for them.  But we can do much better than the 
status quo.
Employer-based Health Insurance  
Is In Decline
Most insured Americans get their coverage through employ-
ment, either theirs or a family member’s.  But the number and 
percentage of Americans covered by employer-based health in-
surance (EBI) is declining.  Based on the Current Population 
Survey (households), the Employee Benefits Research Insti-
tute (EBRI) found that the percent of all workers with EBI fell 
by 2.8 percentage points between 1987 and 1999.14 Another 
survey showed a decline from 1999 to 2004 of 3.5 percentage 
points.15  Linking the two series implies a decline of about 6.3 
percentage points from 1987 to 2004.  Data from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics, derived from establishment surveys, sug-
gest a greater decline.  For full-time workers in the private sec-
tor, the BLS reports a decrease in medical care coverage of 15 
percentage points from 1989-90 to 2003.  From 2000 to 2005, 
the absolute number of people covered by EBI fell from 177.8 
million to 174.2 million.16 Moreover, the covered percentage 
of the population under age 65 fell from 63.6 percent to 59.8 
percent.  From 2000 to 2005, the percentage of firms offering 
health benefits fell from 69 percent to 60 percent, reflecting 
mainly small employers dropping EBI.17  Put alternatively, the 
percentage of workers in all firms who were covered by EBI 
fell from 63 percent in 2000 to 60 percent in 2005.  There 
are underlying forces that make this trend likely to continue, 
especially the rapidly increasing cost of health insurance.  The 
falling EBI trend shifts the costs of the health-care system 
onto those employers that do provide insurance and onto 
government.
Why Is This Happening?
National Health Expenditures (NHE) reached 16 percent 
of GDP in 2004.  As noted earlier, they are rising faster than 
the GDP, in fact by a margin of 2.5 percentage points per year 
over the past 25 years.  This translates into health-insurance 
premiums rising faster than the affordable increases in total 
compensation, and therefore, faster than incomes.  Family 
premiums reached $13,382 in 200618 compared to $6,740 
in 2000.  In 2006, the average family health-insurance pre-
mium reached 28 percent of the earning power of the median 
household.  Health insurance is pricing itself out of reach.  Of 
course, the real problem is not the insurance policies them-
selves.  It is the underlying costs of health-care services.  
Causes Of High And Rising National 
Health Expenditures
The causes of the high level of health expenditures and their 
relentless rate of increase transcend the reach of the business 
community and are national in scope.  Indeed, though all other 
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advanced industrialized nations have lower levels of health-
care spending as a share of GDP, their expenditures also are 
rising at rates in excess of their GDPs (though somewhat 
slower than in the United States).  So health expenditure 
increases are a global phenomenon.  The same forces have the 
same effects in government health programs such as Medicare 
and the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.  The fol-
lowing causes interact with each other.
First, there is cost-unconscious demand (unconstrained by the 
global budgets that are used, arguably inefficiently, in other 
countries).  We in the United States have created a system in 
which most people, patients and providers alike, have little 
direct personal interest in making the most cost-efficient 
choices in health care, and often little opportunity to do so.  
American health-care financing and delivery are dominated by 
fee-for-service medicine (FFS), which leaves insured patients 
cost-unconscious, especially at the margin, and which reduces 
the incomes of providers who innovate to reduce the need for 
services.  Indeed, providing patients with more services, even if 
they have little or no medical value, results directly in greater 
incomes and revenues for providers.
All this is exacerbated by tax policy, in particular the exclu-
sion of employer contributions to employee health care and 
insurance, without limit, from the taxable incomes of employ-
ees.  Depending on the tax rates of the different states, this tax 
break means that an extra $100 in health benefits may cost 
many employees only $60-70 in after-tax income.  This too 
biases choices in favor of more costly health care.
Second, expenditures are increased by the extensive deploy-
ment of new technologies that enhance the power of medicine 
to benefit people’s lives, in some cases greatly.  People want to 
have them, their doctors want to provide them, and society 
does not want to deny them.  Thus, the age-specific rate of per 
capita consumption of these technologies has been increasing, 
often at double-digit rates.19 Examples include joint replace-
ments and invasive cardiology procedures.  There are costly 
new biologics that correct inherited enzyme deficiencies.  
Cerezyme, a biologic to treat Gaucher’s disease, now costs 
some $200,000 to $600,000 per patient per year depending on 
weight-related dosage.20  New drugs for some blood clotting 
disorders can exceed $1 million per year.  Some cancer drugs 
are also very costly.  
Cost-unconscious demand gives an extra impetus to the 
development and deployment of many costly new technolo-
gies.  Providers are often rewarded with prestige, patients and 
revenue for using the most costly new technologies.  Converse-
ly, under FFS, there is little demand for expenditure-reducing 
technologies.  Technology developers know that patients and 
their doctors will not go through a careful weighing of costs 
versus benefits.  Indeed, the Medicare program is prohibited 
by law from considering costs in coverage decisions.  Doctors 
are essentially reimbursed for cost, and so save nothing for 
themselves (or their patients) by rejecting new and more ex-
pensive technologies.  Many of the new technologies have been 
evaluated and are valuable for health outcomes.  Others go into 
widespread use without a thorough evaluation, and may not be 
more beneficial than existing, less costly technologies.21
In the United States, we have a culture that places a very high 
value on advanced medical technology and has great faith in it.  
(Recall John Edwards in 2004 saying: “If we do the work that 
we can do in this country [with stem cell research]… people 
like Christopher Reeve are going to walk, get up out of that 
wheelchair and walk again.”22)  A culture with this enthusiasm 
can regard cost reduction as unworthy.  One young physician 
reported: “In training, we were taught that if you really care 
about cost, you are not a good doctor.”  Who wants to be (or to 
go to) the “low-priced doctor”?
Third, there has been a large increase in the prevalence of 
chronic disease and our ability to treat it.23  An analysis by 
K.E. Thorpe observes that “among adults ages 20-74, obesity 
prevalence increased from 14.5 percent (1976-80) to 30.4 
percent 20 years later (1999-2000).  During the same period, 
total diabetes prevalence, which is clinically linked to obesity, 
increased 53 percent, and diagnosed (treated) diabetes preva-
lence increased 43 percent.”  He examined 20 medical condi-
tions accounting for the largest portion of the rise in private 
health-care spending between 1987 and 2002, and found that 
these conditions accounted for 67 percent of the per capita 
growth in private health-insurance costs during this period.  
This problem is exacerbated by a health-care system that is not 
oriented to early detection and treatment or to chronic disease 
management, but rather to the treatment of symptoms when 
they arise.  
The prevalence of chronic conditions and the cost of their 
treatment are of fundamental importance to the appropriate 
structure and focus of the health-care financing and delivery 
system.  Johns Hopkins University has a center called Part-
nership for Solutions, which studies the prevalence and cost 
of chronic conditions.24  They find that in 2005, 133 million 
Americans had a chronic condition, with such conditions 
defined as those that “last a year or longer and limit what one 
can do and/or require ongoing medical care.”  The number is 
growing faster than the population in general, in part be-
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cause the population is aging, and because medical advances 
have transformed former deadly diseases into costly chronic 
conditions, as in the case of HIV/AIDS.  (The anti-retroviral 
therapy for HIV/AIDS costs roughly $18,000 per year in the 
United States.)  The most prevalent chronic conditions are hy-
pertension, arthritis, respiratory diseases, cholesterol disorders, 
chronic mental conditions, heart disease, eye disorders, asthma 
and diabetes.  In addition, there are some cancers, congestive 
heart failure, and end-stage renal disease.  In 2001, care given 
to people with chronic conditions accounted for 83 percent of 
total health-care spending.  (This does not necessarily mean 
that that much of the care was for chronic conditions – only 
that it was for people having chronic conditions.)  In fact, 62 
percent of all health-care spending was on behalf of people 
with two or more chronic conditions.  As the Johns Hopkins 
report concludes, “…the care provided in the current acute, 
episodic model is not cost-effective and often leads to poor 
outcomes for patients with chronic conditions.”  This has led 
the IOM to recommend “[c]are based on continuous healing 
relationships,” which is particularly difficult to achieve when 
workers so frequently change jobs, and as a result, change (or 
even lose) health insurance and health caregivers.25
Fourth, in the United States, health-care delivery is dominated 
by fragmented, uncoordinated, small-practice fee-for-service 
(FFS), the traditional model in this country and others.  This 
system can be extremely wasteful.  It is filled with cost-increas-
ing incentives.  It in effect rewards and encourages such things 
as wasteful duplication of tests.  It is poorly organized for sys-
tematic improvement in system coordination, overall economy 
and safety, or even measurement of performance.  It lacks 
incentives for such innovations as health information tech-
nology,26 which is not in the economic interest of individual 
providers.  Unfortunately, FFS sets the standard for economic 
performance in the non-FFS sector.  For example, Medicare 
payments to the other common delivery mode, health main-
tenance organizations (HMOs), are tied to FFS costs in the 
same geographic areas and on a risk-adjusted basis.  Prepaid 
group practices have been able to raise their prices in step with 
FFS-based insurance.  In other countries, specialists are sala-
ried, in hospital-based practices, usually under global budgets.
We will never get an economically efficient health-care system 
without the right incentives.  The present dominant system is 
very far from that.
And fifth, because most health-care delivery is local, there are 
insurer, hospital or system monopolies at that level.  Anti-trust 
policy at the local level is weak and unfocused or does not exist 
at all.
EBI Costs Cause Major Problems  
For Employers
EBI costs give employers a powerful incentive to try to avoid 
this growing burden, while continuing to pay attractive cash 
wages.  This can be done, in part, by tightening restrictions on 
who is eligible for EBI, and by increasing required employee 
contributions so that low-paid workers do not choose to pay 
their share and participate.  Thus, about 80 percent of employ-
ees in firms offering EBI are actually eligible, and only about 
83 percent of the eligible actually participate.27 These policies 
mitigate employer problems, but they cause serious human 
problems and they do not help forestall the decline in EBI.  
Rising EBI costs force employers to face some unpleasant 
choices.  When general inflation is high, employers can mask 
the increased costs by giving wage increases that are less than 
the inflation rate.  However, when the inflation rate is low, as 
is now the case, employers must seek to reduce benefits, e.g. by 
raising deductibles and shifting costs to employees, or to re-
duce cash pay – either of which (particularly the latter) evokes 
employee dissatisfaction.  Alternatively, employers can simply 
close the plant or office and obtain the services from lower-
cost labor overseas.  Or they can selectively outsource services 
overseas, or to low-cost employers in this country who do not 
provide health insurance.  
Employers are constrained by the forms of insurance that are 
offered; they must deal with the market as it exists.  One or a 
small group of employers cannot revamp the entire system.  In 
today’s market for health insurance, there is little demand for 
economical care.  One or a small group of employers acting 
alone to create competition in a market that is largely cost-
unconscious is not rewarded with the competitive health-care 
delivery system that would result if all did.  Unfortunately, 
the great diversity of interests, circumstances and views about 
health insurance among employers has precluded collective 
action to create a market open to competition from efficient 
delivery systems.
Employer Responses To Date Have Not 
Solved The Problem
Employers have tried to control their costs, by innovating in 
the delivery of insurance, and health care generally, to their 
employees.  The incentive to innovate can be strong, because 
individual U.S. firms can become less competitive relative to 
each other, and producers of tradable goods and services can 
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lose market share relative to foreign firms.  Because merely 
shifting costs to employees is a clearly visible dead end, firms 
have experimented in wellness programs, preventive care, and 
management of chronic conditions, backed up with financial 
incentives, and with on-site exercise and basic-care facili-
ties.  Firms have tried bargaining with providers, using health 
records to promote “evidence-based medicine” to choose the 
best treatments, and creating “high-performance networks” of 
physicians with strong records of cost-efficient care.28  On the 
other side of the transaction, employers have created quick-ac-
cess low-cost health facilities in retail stores, and cut-priced 
strategies for dozens of basic prescription drugs.
All of these approaches are helpful.  However, it is not clear 
that any one, or even a carefully selected combination among 
them, would do more than achieve (admittedly welcome) one-
time savings in costs.  The reason is that none would change in 
any fundamental way the practice of medicine, or the flow and 
arguably cost-inefficient adoption of new and ever-more-ex-
pensive technologies into the health-care marketplace.
One approach toward changing insurance and health care 
more fundamentally, Consumer-Directed Health Plans 
(CDHP) (sometimes called High-Deductible Health Plans 
(HDHP), involves some elements that would be valuable for 
the health-care system, such as greater transparency in health-
care quality and prices (which are included in other ideas as 
well, including CED’s own 2002 statement), and greater re-
sponsibility on the part of consumers.†  However, CDHPs are 
not, over the long run, a complete answer to the cost problem.
Some firms are using CDHPs to try to find insurance that is 
affordable to their lower-wage workers (the CDHP premium 
can be lower because the cost of care below the high deductible 
is paid by the employee if and when care is needed).  In the 
extreme, in the short run, CDHPs are one way for firms hard-
pressed to continue existing insurance to shift the burden of 
EBI to employees (or “rebalance the compensation portfolio”).  
However, in the long run, that will not mitigate the problem of 
expenditures growing faster than affordable total compensa-
tion.  This is because health-care expenditures, in any year, are 
very concentrated on few people – the most-costly 10 per cent 
use 70 per cent of the resources – so most spending will be on 
people who have exceeded their deductibles, or can reason-
ably expect to do so, in which case the marginal cost to them 
of more care will be at or near zero.  (In 2002, 80 percent of 
health spending was on people who incurred at least $3,219.)29 
There are other problems with the high-deductible approach.  
Many people do not have much money in the bank, if they 
even have bank accounts.  They may lack the funds to pay 
the deductible expenses.  This may create incentives to forgo 
necessary care, leading to more costly medical needs later on.  
(Some HDHP plans attempt to mitigate this by exempting 
preventive care services from the deductible.  The success of 
this strategy in the long run is uncertain.  Another tool to pay 
for large deductibles is the health savings account (HSA).  
However, persons with low incomes, facing low (or zero) mar-
ginal tax rates, have correspondingly low incentives (and lim-
ited means) to contribute to the accounts, and the employers 
of low-wage workers may not contribute.  Those accounts may 
then be filled with public grants.  However, if the deductibles 
are in effect paid with public grants, it is questionable whether 
the beneficiaries have any remaining incentive to economize on 
discretionary health care.)  
In an alternative approach, some large employers have offered 
employees responsible choices (in which the employees are 
responsible for the additional cost of more-expensive plans) 
across a wide range of health-care delivery systems, but such 
employers are usually not large enough in any area to impact 
appreciably the whole delivery system.  In addition, many 
employers that do offer choices also contribute some high 
percentage (80-100 percent) of the premium of any plan of the 
employee’s choice.  Though apparently generous, this subsidiz-
es the inefficient systems against the efficient, biasing choices 
toward more-costly plans.  Many of the employers who do this 
are constrained by collective bargaining agreements and the 
demands of unions to make the employer pay the whole pre-
mium.  The struggles of the Detroit car companies illustrate 
how difficult it can be to change this.  
To illustrate, consider a health plan that is competing in a 
group where the employer pays 80 percent of the premium.  
The health plan management asks: “Should we make the ef-
fort to cut costs and premiums by $1.00 in order to attract 
more customers?” The answer is: “Probably not; the customers 
considering choosing us will get to keep only 20 cents pretax, 
and maybe about 12-14 cents after tax.  Perhaps it would be 
better to spend the dollar on other things that would attract 
customers more.”  Thus, the strong incentive is to increase, not 
decrease, costs.  Economists call this “price-inelastic demand.”  
Markets cannot discipline prices when demand is inelastic.
† CED will discuss CDHP and HDHP in greater detail in a subsequent statement.
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Buyers Have Been Unable To Achieve 
Sustainable Growth Rates In Health 
Expenditure
The biggest problem with EBI is that employers, acting indi-
vidually, collectively, or in concert with government, have been 
unable to conceive and execute any strategy to address effec-
tively the problem of unsustainable expenditure growth.
Employers in general have not been able to create competi-
tion in the market so that more-efficient delivery systems can 
emerge and compete and take market share from the domi-
nant fragmented, uncoordinated fee-for-service small-practice 
model that still accounts for most health-care delivery.  Alter-
native delivery systems cannot market their superior efficiency 
in the form of lower premiums; remarkably, there is no market 
in which such efficient systems compete with each other to 
serve premium-price-sensitive consumers.  
As one possible example of greater efficiency, the RAND 
Health Insurance Experiment, a randomized comparison 
study, found that Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 
a leading prepaid group practice, delivered high-quality care 
for 28 percent fewer resources than did the FFS sector in Se-
attle.30  Yet neither they nor imitators have been very successful 
in that market.  Group Health Cooperative has not been able 
to force the rest of the market to meet its efficiency perfor-
mance.  Employer policies forced it to create a network of FFS 
solo doctors as a combined offering so that they could compete 
in the market demanding “full replacement” – that is, one plan 
serving a whole employment group.  In this way, employer 
policies actually destroyed value by forcing a delivery system to 
revert to a less-efficient delivery model.
Upon reflection, it should be clear why greater efficiency has 
not been rewarded in the health-care marketplace.  The domi-
nant FFS system contains incentives for over-use, under-use 
and misuse of medical technology.31  It contains no built-in 
system of performance measurement (other than revenues), no 
monitoring and no feedback into quality improvement.  It pays 
for the volume of services, not for quality, not for actually cur-
ing the patient promptly.  It pays more to providers who cause 
complications or are slow to make a diagnosis.  This applies to 
hospitals as well as to physicians.  (For more detail and sources 
for these assertions, see Appendix A.)
It is most unusual to see a “market” in which producers of-
fering more value for money cannot translate this advantage 
into a larger and growing market share.  To create a market in 
which the efficient can drive the others to greater efficiency, 
the great majority of employers would have to offer their 
employees responsible choices of delivery systems (and their 
affiliated health-insurance plans) so that the insurance plans 
could pass on their efficiencies to customers in the form of 
lower premiums.  (“Responsible” here means with fixed-dol-
lar employer contributions, or some other method that allows 
employees who choose the efficient alternative to pay less and 
keep the savings.)  And they would have to offer plans that 
select providers for quality and efficiency, not only wide-access 
PPOs that include virtually all physicians.  Most employers do 
not offer such choices.  One employer changing to this model 
would not get the benefit of a fully competitive health-care 
system as long as most other employers did not.
Traditional FFS, in which providers set their own fees, has 
largely been replaced by wide-access “preferred provider 
organizations” (PPOs), nearly all-inclusive networks of FFS 
providers who accept the network’s negotiated fees as payment 
in full.  But this is a change more in form than substance.  Be-
cause most providers know that these networks must include 
them to satisfy customer demand, the networks are not in 
a position to drive hard bargains.  PPOs cannot really trade 
volume for price because they exclude few, if any, providers.  
The wide-access PPO that permits people to get their care 
from anywhere, even including efficient delivery systems, is not 
a “choice” in the sense of the preceding paragraph – because the 
premium of the PPO reflects the efficiency of all the partici-
pating providers in the community, not just the efficient ones.
In addition, most employers do not offer meaningful choices 
of health plans.  This problem extends across firms of different 
sizes.
Small businesses can be locked out of insurance altogether 
because of a pre-existing health risk, or because of high prices; 
and small-employer work forces are not large enough to be 
attractive risk pools for insurers.  Only 41 per cent of workers 
in firms with 3-24 employees are covered by their employer’s 
health benefits, and only 59 per cent for firms with 50-199 
workers.32
 Medium-sized firms, and small businesses that do manage to 
offer coverage, are usually constrained to the services of one in-
surance carrier because of insurers’ dislike of “slice business”—
that is, understandable concern over high administrative costs 
per insured worker, and the instability that can be caused by 
adverse selection, when different carriers compete for business 
within a comparatively small employee pool.  Some firms in 
this category give all their business to one insurance carrier, 
10 Part One – The Problem
which offers two or three “plan designs” (e.g. HMO, PPO, 
HDHP).  However, most often all of these plans market the 
services of the same unaffiliated FFS doctors.  For this reason, 
this choice of “plans,” meaning “plan designs,” is not competi-
tion either among carriers or among delivery systems.  Thus, 
they are not efficient delivery systems, and they display most 
of the flaws of uncontrolled FFS.  For example, these “carrier 
HMOs” put themselves in the difficult position of stand-
ing between FFS doctors who want to do more services, and 
patients who want to receive more services, and trying to cre-
ate restraints.  Their insurance costs rise with industry costs.  
Usually, employees are locked into a wide-access PPO so that 
every employee can have insured access to his/her favorite doc-
tors.  The PPO is really uncoordinated FFS, not an organized 
delivery system.  
Even large firms sometimes offer employees only one plan, or 
one carrier.  Sometimes this is due to past collective bargain-
ing agreements.  In addition, even large firms that do offer 
distinct choices, as was noted earlier, sometimes cover a high 
fixed percentage – 80 per cent, or even 100 per cent – of the 
premium of whatever plan the employee chooses.  This situa-
tion also can be driven by collective bargaining.  (Ironically, it is 
not unheard of for employees who are confused by alternative 
complex insurance agreements, and who will pay little or noth-
ing whichever they choose, to pick the most expensive, on the 
assumption that the costliest must be the best.)
So most employers offer a single carrier, and their insurance 
companies give them incentives to do so or even require it 
– with minimum participation requirements or offers of better 
prices if the insurers can cover the whole group.  As a result, 
there is no reward to insurers to provide good coverage at low 
prices – and little or no consumer pressure for them to do so.  
With limited incentives for better performance, it is not sur-
prising that the health-care sector has seen rising prices with 
little or no indication of better health outcomes.  If employees 
had choices, and if they bore the cost of a choice of a more 
expensive plan, it is more likely that insurers and health-care 
providers would try to find more efficient ways of providing 
better health-care results.
Employers that do offer their employees fully cost-conscious 
choices among delivery systems, like the University of Cali-
fornia, Wells Fargo and Hewlett-Packard, often find that very 
high percentages, like 75-80 percent, choose among the least 
expensive plans which, in these cases, are group practice-based 
HMOs.  This is in stark contrast to most other employer ar-
rangements in which employees have no choice of carrier or 
little or no incentive to choose a lower-priced plan.  This dif-
ference reflects the effect of price-sensitive choice, and the fact 
that many people choose an alternative mode of organization 
if they would otherwise have to pay the extra cost of a more 
expensive one.  
The Federal Government buys health-care services in at least 
three ways.  In the case of Medicare, FFS predominates and it 
has not so far been possible politically to subject it to effective 
competition from more efficient alternatives.  In the case of the 
Federal Government as employer, that is, the Federal Employ-
ees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP), the government offers 
employees multiple choices of health plans and also a semi-
fixed-dollar contribution.†  Where they exist geographically, 
other modes of organization, including HMOs, often do well 
in the FEHBP.†† In the case of the Veterans Administration 
Health System and DOD TriCare, the government has had an 
integrated delivery system for some time – and there has been 
great innovation, especially in the Veterans Administration, 
in such areas as chronic disease management and adoption of 
electronic health records.  In the latter case, the VAH clearly 
leads the private sector.
In theory, large employers could try to go into the health-
care management business and organize their own delivery 
† There is an important deficiency and inflationary bias in the structure of the FEHBP.  The government, as employer, contributes an amount set at 70 percent 
of the average price of the largest plans in the system.  If a plan were to come in with a premium below the contribution level, the employee would get to keep 
25 percent of the difference while the government would keep 75 percent.  After tax, the employee would keep less, perhaps 15 percent.  So there is not much 
incentive for a plan to offer prices below the average and attempt to drive down the prices.
†† There is an artifact in the pricing scheme that works to the disadvantage of HMOs in the FEHBP.  The program contains several nationwide fee-for-service 
plans whose premiums reflect costs averaged over the whole nation, including many low-cost areas.  HMOs, on the other hand, are local entities, and those in 
high cost metropolitan areas must bear the costs associated with doing business in those areas.  HMOs tend to be in metropolitan areas.  The program would 
do a better job of promoting competition if it used regional pricing.
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systems.  That is how Kaiser Permanente started.  However, 
that would be very difficult today.  Henry Kaiser had a lot to 
learn about doctors and health care, and the lessons did not 
come quickly.  Only the largest employers, or very cohesive 
coalitions, could consider it.  Generally, employer work forces 
in any one geographic area are small compared to the size 
that efficient delivery systems need to achieve economies of 
scale, that is, several hundred thousand members.  Few, if any, 
employers have enough employees in any given area to support 
one integrated delivery system, much less the two or three that 
would be needed to create competition.  Since Henry Kaiser, 
few employers have attempted this so far, usually with poor re-
sults.  Health care is a complex business.  Organizing efficient 
health-care delivery is not part of the core competence of most 
employers.  
Alternatively, several employers could try to collaborate to 
create an efficient health-care system of sufficient size.  The 
Minnesota Buyers’ Health Care Action Group (BHCAG), 
originally formed in 1991 by 14 large, self-insured employ-
ers in the Twin Cities, is a rare example.33 In 1997, BHCAG 
offered employees of participating employers a broad choice of 
“care systems” built around groups of primary care physicians 
and affiliated specialists and hospitals.  Each care system set its 
own price for covering an employee of standard risk.  Care-sys-
tem-specific provider fees were developed.  If actual expendi-
tures exceeded the bid amount, adjusted for enrollee risk, the 
fees actually paid could be reduced to bring the expenditures 
back into line with the care system’s bid, creating a kind of “vir-
tual capitation.”  There was risk adjustment (that is, transfer of 
premium revenues to the insurers or care systems that enrolled 
costly risks from those that did not), employee cost-conscious 
choice, and quality measurement and reporting.  This was the 
best private-sector implementation of economically rational 
incentives.  Its enrollment reached about 150,000 employees 
and dependents.  In the face of comings and goings of key 
personnel and company ownership (i.e. acquisitions), it proved 
difficult to sustain employer commitment, and attempts to 
export this model to other cities were not successful.  Some 
of the success in the Twin Cities could be ascribed to special 
features of the Twin Cities market, such as the presence of 
multi-specialty group practices and national firms headquar-
tered there.  
In sum, the current employer-based health-insurance system 
is poorly structured for competition and incentives to improve 
efficiency.  In light of these fundamental problems, it is not 
surprising that costs have risen faster than quality, and it is not 
likely that this outcome will change on its own.  
The CED Statement Of 2002—Has It 
Made A Difference For Health-Care 
Reform?
As was mentioned at the outset, CED issued a statement on 
health care in 2002.34  It contained numerous sensible and im-
portant recommendations for business and government.  For 
example, for employers:
1. Demand transparent quality information and adherence 
to best medical practices; use comparative performance 
information to select plans and providers; incorporate 
accountability for cost and quality into contract specifica-
tions.
2. Offer wide, responsible health plan choices to employees 
in exchange for their greater financial responsibility.  Such 
plans would incorporate contribution policies that encour-
age workers to choose efficient, high-quality plans…help 
to establish, operate, and manage regional purchasing 
cooperatives that offer affordable plans to small firms.
For government:
1. Restructure Medicare on the model of the Federal Em-
ployee Health Benefit Program [that is, wide, responsible 
choices].
2. Cap the currently open-ended federal tax exclusion of 
employer contributions to promote cost discipline and 
equity; this could also provide some funding for policies to 
expand access.
3. Provide vehicles, funding, and technical assistance to 
establish purchasing cooperatives for small employers.  
Substantial progress towards these policies since the release of 
the statement is difficult to discern.  Transparent quality in-
formation based on results or outcomes is difficult to come by, 
though ongoing efforts to develop it ought to continue.  Many 
opportunities, such as to extend to the whole nation the work 
being done by the State of New York, and a few other states, 
on risk-adjusted outcomes for cardiology procedures have 
been missed.35 A great deal of useful work that might have 
been done has not.  Measurement of adherence to best medical 
practices requires development of guidelines, and then infor-
mation systems to make the measurements.  Leading integrat-
ed delivery systems like Health Partners in Minnesota and its 
cooperating medical group practices had created the Institute 
for Clinical Systems Improvement; businesses have worked to-
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gether in the Leapfrog Group; Kaiser Permanente had created 
their Care Management Institute to define practice guidelines 
before 2002; the Veterans Health Administration had created 
a similar Quality Enhancement Research Initiative.  And they 
have continued this work.  But there has not been a great deal 
of similar progress elsewhere.
The trend in the offering of wide, responsible health plan 
choices to employees is difficult to judge because it is not 
measured in regular surveys.  The two most important surveys 
were done in 1997 and 2000.  The former surveyed a represen-
tative sample of U.S. employers and found that the employers 
of 77 per cent of employed insured Americans did not offer a 
choice of carriers, and 28 percent of establishments offering a 
choice contributed a fixed-dollar amount for single coverage 
to all health-insurance plans (and therefore gave employees an 
incentive to make a cost-effective choice), thus leaving only 6.4 
percent (.23 times .28) with both a choice and a fixed-dollar 
contribution.36 The latter survey found that fewer than 10 per 
cent of Fortune 500 employees combined a choice of carrier 
and a fixed-dollar contribution.37
Similar surveys have not been done since, possibly indicating 
a lack of interest in the issue.  However, there is little evidence 
that this situation has improved.  On the positive side, both 
Wells Fargo and Hewlett-Packard, which previously offered 
choices, have recently adopted the defined contribution ap-
proach.  However, this is the only indication of progress.  The 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation and Health Research and 
Educational Trust publish an annual Survey of Employer 
Health Benefits which touches on the subject of employee 
choices.  Unfortunately, they survey and report on “choice of 
plan,” meaning “plan designs.”  Their survey would report that 
an employment group offering one carrier, with three plan de-
signs (e.g. HMO, PPO, POS (Point of Service) or High De-
ductible Health Plan) all providing insured access to the same 
networks of FFS providers, would be offering three plans.  But 
this is neither competition at the insurance carrier level nor at 
the delivery-system level, so this is not choice from the point of 
view of bringing about delivery-system competition.  Regret-
tably, even by that defective measure, the survey shows little 
change in the frequency of offering a “choice of plan.”
As noted earlier, employers considering offering choices are 
inhibited by concern over administrative costs, the possibility 
of adverse selection, and insurance company preferences to be 
the sole carrier for the group.  The 2002 CED report called for 
large multi-employer exchanges, like CalPERS, that pool the 
purchasing of large numbers of employers and therefore create 
a market in which many carriers will be willing to participate.  
That would take sustained collective action among employers.  
Unfortunately, employers find it difficult if not impossible to 
organize collective action because their interests and priorities 
are so diverse: some are large, some small; some have foreign 
competition, some do not have much competition; some are 
unionized (and most, but not all, unions demand that employ-
ers subsidize more costly choices), some not; some have mainly 
high-paid employees, while some have mostly low-paid work-
ers (for whom health-insurance costs are a larger percentage 
of total compensation).  Multiply this diversity by the myriad 
views and understandings of what health care is all about, and 
the difficulty of collective action is clear.  
In the summer of 2006, the Pacific Business Group on Health 
announced that PacAdvantage, a voluntary pooled purchas-
ing arrangement for small employers of 2-50 workers, was 
closing because one of the carriers was persistently losing 
money in that business.  If pooled purchasing arrangements 
are wholly voluntary, a spiral of adverse selection against the 
pool is almost inevitable unless there is a strong incentive for a 
large representative sample of employers to participate.  There 
need to be strong incentives, such as access to tax exclusions, 
to hold such pools together.  (The problem may be mitigated, 
and possibly solved, by the use of a risk adjustment proce-
dure under which groups with predictably higher costs pay 
proportionately more, relieving employers of comparatively 
healthy employees of the burden of sharing in the costs of the 
more costly groups.  Technology exists to do this.  However, 
this would work against the ideal of broadening the risk pool 
even more substantially and evening out costs and risks so that 
everyone could afford insurance.)  Also, a system of reinsur-
ance of very high-cost cases could help a great deal.  Employ-
ers apparently did not put a high value on being able to offer 
competing choices to their employees.  Creating competition 
is a collective action problem.  That is, one employer offer-
ing responsible choices will not get the benefit of a reformed 
competitive delivery system.  That takes concerted action by 
many employers.  However, if employers are unable to collabo-
rate to create an effective competitive market, there may well 
be a need for some public-policy response to the problem of 
soaring costs of insurance.
As to the recommendations for government action, the idea of 
restructuring Medicare to work like the FEHBP has attracted 
some rhetorical support, but progress toward making Medi-
care into a defined-contribution competitive model has been 
only incremental.  The Congress did take an important step 
forward in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement and 
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Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) in providing that Part D 
of Medicare would be organized through price-sensitive indi-
vidual choice of prescription-drug insurance plans from among 
many alternatives.  The addition of new, at-risk competitors 
in the Medicare Advantage program, such as regional PPOs 
and private fee-for-service plans, has added a new competitive 
dynamic, but only so long as underlying payment levels are at-
tractive.  The shift in the program from an administered-pric-
ing model to one in which plans engage in a quasi-competitive 
bid process has the potential to create a new competitive force 
– although this is limited by the retention of statutory pricing 
as the yardstick that determines government payments, not-
withstanding the competitive basis of the bid.  Whether these 
changes will have a lasting impact is not clear, particularly if 
competition among providers – both in Medicare Advantage 
and traditional Medicare – does not flow from these changes.  
More important will be the nascent move toward quality-
based payment for providers and health-care organizations, 
which rewards both efficiency and good outcomes.  
Conclusion
In short, in 2002 CED mapped out a private, voluntary path 
toward creation of an effective market for competing health 
plans and delivery systems.  We remain confident that such 
ideas, if adopted widely and vigorously, could work.  However, 
there is little or no evidence that these ideas are being taken up 
and acted upon in a timely manner.  It is now not at all clear 
that constructive change to create an effective market model 
will happen before NHE reaches 20 per cent of GDP, family 
premiums reach 40 per cent of the earning power of the me-
dian household, and the number of uninsured reaches 60-80 
million.  At that point, desperation could break out, creating 
a fertile ground for simplistic “solutions” that do not work, or 
indeed do more harm than good.
And yet there is the potential for a better health-care system 
at the same or lower cost.  As was noted at the outset, patients 
today are treated at considerable cost, but receive only about 
† There is a successful broker-created multiple choice arrangement for small employers that offers, in Southern California, a choice of 6 or 8 delivery systems 
to employees of participating employers, called California Choice.  It covers 170,000 lives and is growing.  It is not entirely clear how this survives and prospers 
when PacAdvantage could not.
†† The next CED Statement will address the merits of the high-deductible approach in greater detail.
Capping the exclusion of employer contributions from em-
ployee taxable incomes to induce cost-consciousness was rec-
ommended by the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform, 
but apparently rejected out of hand.  Purchasing cooperatives 
for small employers have, for the most part, gone in the wrong 
direction, closing rather than proliferating.†  The Congress has 
not considered serious proposals to condition continued access 
to the tax exclusion on the offering of choices and defined con-
tributions, but something like that might provide the incentive 
for small employers to form or join such pooled arrangements 
to achieve economies of scale.  
Some changes have been in the wrong direction. For example, 
the emphasis on high deductibles, despite the best of inten-
tions, could weaken primary care, disease prevention and 
disease management, with the side effect of lessening the 
already insufficient market forces of competition for the now 
privileged FFS model.††
half of what best practice would define as appropriate care.  
This suggests strongly that following better practice would 
result in better health and lower costs down the line.  In the 
same vein, reputable studies have identified excessive and inap-
propriate treatment and expense.  This suggests opportunities 
for savings that would have no cost in terms of health.  Thus, 
our health-care system could deliver better care at low or even 
negative additional cost – without the feared necessity of 
withholding beneficial care in the interest of cost.  The nation 
should pursue greater efficiency in the existing system first.
The next part of this statement will explain why the most 
widely discussed large-scale “solutions” would not work.  In 
a later statement, CED will explore steps to restructure the 
health-care market to achieve greater cost effectiveness and 
coverage for all.
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Now, of course, the general store is a vague memory for all 
but the most rural parts of the United States.  It has been 
overtaken by technology in goods themselves, in organi-
zation, in transportation and distribution, in financing, 
and in countless other areas.  Although this quaint and 
warmly remembered institution is gone, the vast majority 
of the population surely believes that they are better off 
today with the fruits of competition and the resulting in-
novation: greater efficiency, lower prices (relative to typical 
incomes), and a wider array of up-to-date choices.
But even though the general store and most other eco-
nomic institutions of that era are gone, rendered obsolete 
by organizational and technological improvements, fee-
for-service solo-practice medicine goes on – even though 
the nation’s health-care system is widely regarded to be in 
crisis.  Why?  The answer is largely inertia – because the 
existing institution was never challenged, as the general 
store was, by meaningful competition from alternative 
forms of organization.
No one can know what the results of greater competition 
in health-care delivery would be.  (And of course, one can 
speak only of the results of competition at any one mo-
ment, because further innovation and change would go on 
endlessly.)  It is even possible that innovations would arise 
that would breathe new life into the FFS solo-practice 
model.  The one thing that we do know with certainty is 
that the cost of health care under the status quo is rising 
unsustainably, threatening access and quality for every 
American.  We cannot continue on this path.
FFS solo-practice medicine came to be based on the fol-
lowing principles:
 • “Free choice of doctor” at all times.  That means that 
the insurer that pays the bills has no bargaining power 
with the doctor because it cannot influence whether 
or not the patient goes to any particular doctor.
 • “Free choice of treatment,” i.e. nobody “interferes” with 
the doctor’s treatment decisions and recommenda-
tions.  This means no monitoring of compliance with 
established practice guidelines, no utilization manage-
ment, no quality management and no peer review.  
Process, organization and management innovations 
such as these have been the life blood of progress in 
virtually every other industry in the developed eco-
nomic world.
APPENDIX: Economic Aspects And 
Consequences Of The Traditional Fee-
for-service Small Practice Model (FFS)
Medical practice in the United States is dominated by the 
fragmented, uncoordinated, fee-for-service (“FFS”) solo (or 
small single-specialty group) practice model of health-care 
organization and finance.  This appendix explains this model, 
its origins, and its consequences for health expenditure in this 
country.  It is important to understand that the dominance of 
this model is not the natural consequence of market forces.  
Rather, it has been sustained by inertia, unchallenged because 
of the absence of normal competitive forces in the health-care 
market.  It needs to be subjected to competition from in-
formed, financially responsible consumer choice.  In those lim-
ited instances when competition is at work, alternative modes 
of organization of health-care delivery do much better.
I. The Traditional Fee-for-service 
Indemnity Model Of Health-care 
Finance Is Fundamentally Flawed
	 A.	 The	Fee-For-Service	Model	Explained
The traditional fee-for-service, solo-practice model of 
medical organization and finance is as old as medical sci-
ence itself.  In the early days of this country, when there 
was only one doctor for wide swaths of the frontier, solo 
practice was inevitable.  For years thereafter, the body of 
medical knowledge was sufficiently narrow that there was 
no such thing as a “specialist;” apart from differences in 
individual skill, one physician was interchangeable with 
any other.  Again, solo practice was the inevitable result.  
Health insurance did not exist, and so people paid for 
each service when they needed the doctor.  Fees and costs 
were restrained by the limits of patients’ willingness and 
ability to pay.  The patients were using their own money 
and went without care they could not afford unless they 
were poor enough to be considered charity cases.
Similarly, in those days, retailing began with the “gen-
eral store.”  There was not a sufficient range of goods to 
justify more than one store for many, or even most, of the 
geographic regions of the country.  Competition between 
stores was unheard of.
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After years during which patients were using their own 
money and going without care they could not afford, 
employment-based health insurance grew rapidly and 
became widespread during and after World War II.  Most 
health insurance was FFS, or “service benefit” insurance, 
by Blue Cross and Blue Shield (“the Blues”).  Hospital 
and physician associations created the Blues to assure 
payment on terms acceptable to them.  (In that case, there 
were agreed-upon fees, but providers sat on both sides of 
the bargaining table where the fees were determined.)38 
In the case of FFS, insurers set indemnity payments 
for each particular service or group of services that they 
would provide to insured patients.  Because of FFS 
principles, there was no contract between doctors and 
insurers.  Doctors often charged more than the indemnity 
payments; under pressure from employees who did not 
want to have to pay the difference, employers instructed 
insurers to raise indemnity payments, and the indemnity 
payments chased the fees.  Under the community rating 
that was dominant in the early years of mass insurance, 
higher claims costs were distributed across all partici-
pants, and so no one increased payment seemed to have 
any meaningful consequences.  Employers often backed 
up indemnity insurance with “major medical insurance” 
that paid most of the patient’s out-of-pocket cost not paid 
by indemnity insurance.  Insurance left patients with little 
or no reason to care what services cost.  The old restraint 
of the patient’s ability and willingness to pay was removed 
or greatly attenuated by insurance.  The FFS model has 
been strained to the breaking point as costs have soared.  
In the FFS model, the idea is that the doctor decides what 
he or she wants to do and what he or she wants to charge, 
and the patient’s role is merely to pay and then seek re-
imbursement from his health plan or employer.  This is a 
model that leaves employers and employees with minimal 
control over the costs of health care – and the employees 
with minimal concern about the costs in the first place.  
	 B.	 Inappropriate	care	and	variation	in	practice	
patterns
Under FFS, providers of care are not held responsible 
for the cost of care.  There is little economic restraint on 
fees.  PPOs are negotiated fee arrangements, but because 
the popular version offers wide access – that is, practi-
cally every provider in town is in the network – the PPO 
has little bargaining power.  It cannot trade volume for 
price.  Insured consumers are not price sensitive.  A doc-
 • “Fee-for-service payment,” which means that the doc-
tor can always earn more by doing and prescribing 
more treatments (and more-costly treatments) wheth-
er or not they would benefit the health of the patient.  
This creates a conflict of interest for the doctor.
 • “Direct doctor-patient negotiation of fees.”  The 
patient is in a very weak position to bargain or shop 
because he depends on the good will of the doc-
tor and lacks information about what other doctors 
charge, or how capable they are, or how many visits or 
procedures they would take to solve a given problem.  
Insurers, on the other hand, have a great deal of such 
information and could use it in the patient’s interest.  
But they are not allowed to do so in the FFS model.  
(This aspect of the model has been superseded by 
Medicare fees and by the wide-access PPO in the 
private sector.)
 • “Solo (or small single-specialty group) practice.”  Doc-
tors depend on other doctors for referrals.  Within a 
multi-specialty group practice, primary-care doctors 
can refer patients to their own specialist partners, thus 
eliminating potential pressure from outside doctors 
who would want referrals.  This puts multi-specialty 
group practices in business conflict with solo practi-
tioners.
Especially because of this last point, and because of the 
lack of competition and innovation in health care in 
general, physicians in solo-practice FFS medicine are put 
in an impossible position.  Because they are trained in 
the context of the FFS model and are fully invested in it 
in all aspects of their careers, they naturally tend to see 
the future of health care in those terms, and to oppose 
departures from that model.  But precisely because costs 
under the status quo are growing at unsustainable rates, 
openness to new options is essential and inevitable.
The traditional FFS model for the organization of and 
payment for medical care maximizes autonomy and 
economic benefits for physicians.  There is reason to 
believe that it is not the best model, and possibly not even 
a sustainable model for our society.  Arguably, it does not 
consider the important and legitimate need of patients 
for affordable care and insurance.  It has survived and 
its performance has been taken as the standard for the 
health-care system in large part because that system is not 
compatible with effective competition to test FFS (and 
the practice of medicine generally) and force it to improve. 
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The practice style that favors inpatient treatment 
greatly affects the demand for hospital care and has 
serious implications for efforts to constrain costs.
Some of the differences in opinion arise because the 
necessary scientific information on outcomes is miss-
ing.  For other conditions, the practice style factor ap-
pears unrelated to scientific controversies.  Physicians 
in some hospital markets practice medicine in ways 
that have extremely adverse implications for the cost 
of care, motivated perhaps by reasons of their own or 
their patients’ convenience, or because of individual-
istic interpretations of the requirements for “defensive 
medicine.”  Whatever the reason, it certainly is not 
because of adherence to medical standards based on 
clinical outcome criteria or even on statistical norms 
based on average performance.  In some markets, 
a substantial proportion of hospitalizations are 
for cases that in other markets are usually treated 
outside the hospital.  If more conservative, ambula-
tory-oriented practice styles were substituted – then 
substantial cost savings and improvements in quality 
could be realized without fear that needed services 
were being withheld.41 
This variation undercuts the notion of “medical necessity” 
as judged by the individual doctor.  It also undercuts the 
notion that there is a “standard of care.”  It suggested some 
people were getting more therapies or procedures than 
was beneficial while others might be getting too few.  This 
pointed to the need for scientific evidence-based practice 
guidelines, which would be more conducive to control of 
costs.  Dr.  Wennberg has continued this line of research 
and from time to time publishes the Dartmouth Atlas of 
Health Care.42  In the Dartmouth Atlas 1999, the Dart-
mouth team reports that in 1996, the age-sex adjusted per 
capita rate of radical prostatectomy for Medicare ben-
eficiaries in the hospital referral area with the most was 
9.4 times that in the referral area with the least, while for 
carotid endarterectomy the ratio was 7.7.  (The procedure 
counts are based on area of residence of the beneficiaries, 
not where the procedure was performed.)
There is a need for scientific, evidence-based practice 
guidelines, produced as a collective effort of teams of 
doctors and others.  In view of the massive amounts of 
medical literature appearing every week, the individual 
doctor – unaided by some organized effort – cannot pos-
sibly keep up and also have time to see patients.  Some 
organization is needed to develop such guidelines, and to 
monitor compliance with them.  The individual physician 
needs to make judgments informed by up-to-date science. 
tor who keeps his/her patients in the hospital longer than 
other doctors, for the same condition and case severity, is 
rewarded with more money and the regard of the hospital 
administration because s/he brought in more revenue.  
Studies by the UCLA Medical School-RAND Corpora-
tion team and by others documented large amounts of 
inappropriate surgery and hospitalization (“inappropriate” 
means the patient would have been better off without it, 
cost not considered).  Other studies found a great deal of 
“unnecessary surgery.”39 
There were and are very wide variations in medical prac-
tices from one community to another and even among 
doctors in the same community.  John Wennberg, M.D., 
professor of medicine at Dartmouth Medical School and 
director of Dartmouth’s Center for the Clinical Evalu-
ative Sciences, documented variations of ten-fold and 
more.40  Doctors in some parts of Vermont did ten or 
more times the per child rate of tonsillectomy as in others. 
This suggests doctors were following their own patterns 
of practice, perhaps doing what they were told in their 
training programs years ago, rather than being guided by 
up-to-date science.  Wennberg’s findings bear quotation at 
length.
Most people view the medical care they receive as a 
necessity provided by doctors who adhere to scientific 
norms based on previously tested and proven treat-
ments.  When the contents of the medical care “black 
box” are examined more closely, however, the type 
of medical service provided is often found to be as 
strongly influenced by subjective factors related to 
the attitudes of individual physicians as by science.  
These subjective considerations, which I call collec-
tively the “practice style factor,” can play a decisive role 
in determining what specific services are provided a 
given patient as well as whether treatment occurs in 
the ambulatory or the inpatient setting.  As a conse-
quence, this style factor has profound implications for 
the patient and the payer of care.
For example, the practice style factor affects whether 
patients with menopausal symptoms, with hypertro-
phy of the tonsil, with hyperplasia of the prostate, 
with mild angina, or with a host of other ailments 
receive conservative treatments in an ambulatory 
setting or undergo a surgical operation in a hospital.  
It also affects whether patients with relatively minor 
medical conditions such as bronchitis or gastro-en-
teritis, or who need minor surgical procedures such as 
cystoscopy, teeth extractions, sterilization, or breast 
biopsy receive their care in a hospital or elsewhere.  
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or sham) surgery.  The authors concluded that:  “At no 
point did either of the intervention groups [i.e. those who 
got a real operation] report less pain or better function 
than the placebo group.”  In other words, this operation 
conferred no medical value.  On the other hand, other 
research has shown that “Postoperative thromboembolic 
events [blood clots] are serious complications, and retro-
spective studies have reported an incidence of 0.2% to 7% 
for clinically apparent deep venous thrombosis (DVT) 
and pulmonary embolism (PE).”45  DVTs and pulmonary 
embolisms can lead to strokes, death, and heart damage, 
and to long and costly treatments in and out of hospital 
with anti-coagulation drugs.  According to a report from 
the Baylor College of Medicine: “In the United States, it is 
estimated that more than 650,000 arthroscopic debride-
ment or lavage procedures are performed each year, many 
of these for arthritis, at a cost of about $5000 each.”46  
That amounts to $3.25 billion per year.  Moreover, this 
does not include the costs of treatment of the compli-
cations.  Practice according to the best current science 
would curb such waste.  (UnitedHealthcare reported that 
in 2002, they sent copies of this New England Journal of 
Medicine article to physicians who were doing arthroscopy 
for osteoarthritis).47
The FFS model of insurance gives patients no guidance 
as to who are less costly doctors, and little reason to care.  
All the incentives point to doing too much care, or care of 
little or no marginal value.
Another important driver of cost inflation in the FFS 
model is that hospitals compete for doctors – because 
doctors bring in paying patients – by offering amenities 
such as low-cost convenient office buildings next to hos-
pitals, and by buying the latest and best high-tech equip-
ment.  This leads to a “medical arms race” of proliferation 
of high-tech equipment, much of which is not used to full 
capacity.  Underused specialists and facilities can mean 
lack of proficiency.  This leads to the proliferation of 
hospitals doing costly, complex and dangerous procedures 
such as open-heart surgery in volumes that are so low as 
to be both dangerous and uneconomic.48
	 C.	 FFS	is	inadequate	for	the	treatment	of	chronic	
conditions
There is now growing recognition of the importance and 
cost of chronic disease.  Some estimate that more than 
half of medical resources are spent caring for people 
with chronic conditions.49  However, the FFS model is 
It is arguable that many doctors’ decisions and behavior 
are, understandably, at least influenced by the financial 
incentives in FFS, as well as by the traditions and training 
of the system, and by loyalty to the physician’s particular 
specialty.  The Wall Street Journal recently reported an 
example in an article entitled “Hysterectomy Alternative 
Goes Unmentioned to Many Women.”43
Hundreds of thousands of women go to gynecolo-
gists each year with a common condition known as 
uterine fibroid tumors.  When it’s severe, a majority 
of them get the same recommendation: a hysterec-
tomy, or removal of the uterus.  In recent years, a less 
invasive procedure, known as uterine artery emboli-
zation or UAE, has been growing in popularity.  Yet 
some patients, and even some gynecologists, say many 
gynecologists aren’t telling their patients about the 
alternative.  
A study presented at a medical conference in 2002 
found that of 100 UAE patients at Chicago’s North-
western Memorial Hospital, 79 had learned about the 
procedure from a source other than a gynecologist.  A 
survey by Yale University School of Medicine in 2003 
found that 13 of 21 UAE patients had learned about 
the procedure from the Internet.
“It’s sad,” says Juergen Eisermann, a gynecologist who 
is medical director of the South Florida Institute for 
Reproductive Medicine.  “We do a disservice not to 
mention all the options.”  
Some gynecologists blame the failure to inform 
patients about UAE on the fact that gynecologists 
generally don’t perform the procedure.  Instead, mem-
bers of a specialty known as interventional radiology 
do UAE.  When gynecologists lose the chance to 
perform a hysterectomy, they also lose the roughly 
$2000 fee the gynecologist might have earned.
For the many women for whom the UAE produces a 
better and more desired medical outcome, the more costly 
hysterectomy is not “medically necessary.”  
A good example of a proliferation of unevaluated tech-
nology in FFS is the case of arthroscopic surgery for 
osteoarthritis of the knee.  A recent New England Journal 
of Medicine article reporting a clinical trial that compared 
arthroscopic surgery with a pretend or sham or “placebo” 
operation dramatically illustrated this point.44  Patients 
with osteoarthritis of the knee were randomly assigned to 
and received “arthroscopic debridement” or “arthroscopic 
lavage” (two frequent operations), or placebo (i.e. pretend 
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particularly poorly adapted to this kind of care.  FFS is 
oriented to acute, episodic care.  It pays for doctor visits 
and procedures.  Chronic care needs what the Institute of 
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences (IOM) 
calls “care based on continuous healing relationships” usu-
ally performed by allied health professionals.50  FFS has a 
hard time paying for nurses to telephone patients to ask 
them about their weight, and recommend changes in their 
medications.  
	 D.	 Error,	fraud	and	abuse
Largely because of the FFS method of payment to doctors 
in which millions of individual acts must be billed and 
paid for, improper billing because of fraud, carelessness, 
or errors is a huge problem.  Payers—governmental and 
private—have to sort through millions of claims and sepa-
rate the appropriate and legitimate from the inappropriate 
and false.  The insurance industry has had to innovate to 
do this job.  Reasonable approximations must be used.  
Perfection is not possible.  Getting the payments right 
overall, in the large majority of cases, must be accepted as 
an appropriate standard.  Otherwise, transactions costs 
would soar even more than they have.  
The Report on the Financial Statement Audit of the Health 
Care Financing Administration for Fiscal Year 1996 by 
the Office of the Inspector General of the Department 
of Health and Human Services estimated that in that 
year, the Medicare Program made about $23.2 billion in 
improper payments.51  The main reasons the payments 
were judged to be improper were insufficient documenta-
tion, no documentation, lack of medical necessity, incor-
rect coding, and non-covered or unallowable services.  
Examples of what the audit found are contained in the 
report.52  As the Inspector General’s Report said:  “The 
Medicare program is inherently vulnerable to incorrect 
provider billing practices.”53  The same could be said of all 
insurance under FFS.  
Malcolm Sparrow, who teaches at the Kennedy School 
of Government at Harvard and is an expert on fraud and 
the control of fraud, has written a book entitled License 
to Steal: How Fraud Bleeds America’s Health Care System.54  
Sparrow provides many examples of fraud.  A kind of 
abuse that is particularly hard to detect is, for purely 
economic reasons, increasing the volume of services that 
confer no additional benefit to the patient.55 56 57  
	 E.	 Lack	of	Performance	Tracking
One of the important deficiencies of FFS is its very slow 
(often nonexistent) adoption of comprehensive longi-
tudinal records.  Doctors do not have a systematic way 
of following their patients and tracking the outcomes of 
different procedures and treatments.  They follow those 
of their patients who want to come back and be seen, but 
have little knowledge of the others who should be part 
of the denominator for comparing success rates.  Today, 
outside of prepaid group practice, registries of patients are 
the exception, not the rule.  
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II. CONCLUSION
Under the current health-care delivery system, dominated by 
FFS solo-practice medicine, costs are growing unsustainably, 
and quality and access are far from satisfactory – especially in 
light of how much the American people are paying for their 
care.  Certainly, something must change.  Arguably, the contin-
uation of the FFS model, largely sheltered from competition 
and therefore lacking innovation in organization and process, 
has contributed to the increase in cost without improvement 
in access or in many dimensions of quality.
Many surely hope for the continuation of something very close 
to the traditional organizational model for U.S. health-care de-
livery.  Innovation directed through fortuitous channels might 
make that possible.  However, the unaltered status quo is not 
an option.  Much as we might want the traditional model of a 
single doctor treating a single patient in blessed isolation, our 
society does not have enough doctors; and if we recruited and 
trained them, we could not afford the medical establishment 
that would result.  Our society has reached the point where 
ignoring the mounting costs will result in the loss of access 
– and hence severe harm – to an unfortunate segment of our 
population that is already too large, and is growing too rapidly.
In virtually every other sector of the U.S.  economy, competi-
tion has led to enormous and unpredictable change, but in the 
end to greater value for the consumer.  More-effective competi-
tion in the health-care sector could only be expected to do the 
same.  No one can predict what the outcome would be – in 
five years, ten years, twenty years, or longer – for the organiza-
tion of the health-care sector.  A revitalized FFS model is well 
within the bounds of the possible.  What we can predict is that 
consumers, empowered with choices and information about 
both cost and quality, can be expected to drive the health-care 
sector toward better outcomes – and perhaps to ward off the 
three-way collision of cost, access and quality that now appears 
to be just around the corner.
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Part One of this statement explained that the heart of our 
problems with national health expenditures (NHE) can be 
summarized by the persistent gap of 2.5 percentage points per 
year between the growth in NHE and the growth in GDP.  In 
addition, there are major problems of quality failures and of 
uninsured people lacking financial access to needed medical 
care.  Part One reviewed the causes of the high level and rapid 
growth in NHE, including that our health care is dominated 
by the uncoordinated, fragmented traditional model of fee for 
service and small practice.  
This part will review the following topics:
1. Why, for the past 35 years, the many “band aids” on a 
fundamentally flawed system of health-care financing and 
delivery didn’t work.
2. Why some of the current favorite ideas, though possibly 
useful in the context of comprehensive reform, will not 
work if seen as the solution in themselves.
3. Why “single payer” or “Medicare for All” or “Consumer-
Driven Health Plans” (CDHPs) or “High-Deductible 
Health Plans” (HDHPs), are not complete solutions.
4. The attributes of a fundamentally reformed system that 
has a good chance of success.
The next part of this CED statement, forthcoming, will 
explain in greater detail the specifications of a reformed and 
improved health-care system, and how the nation might 
achieve the least disruptive transition from the current, defi-
cient system.
Why  Years Of “Band Aids” On A 
Fundamentally Flawed System Did Not 
Work
For at least 35 years, there has been a slowly building realiza-
tion that our health-care system is not sustainable.  Costs are 
growing so rapidly that at some not-far-off date, our economy 
will no longer be able to bear them.  Even those who are satis-
fied with their current health-insurance arrangements have 
become less secure that those arrangements can continue.  Fur-
thermore, even those who are most confident that their own 
health insurance is secure must see that more and more people 
have no care at all, to the detriment of our society as a whole.  
Moreover, even practitioners doing their best under the cur-
rent system must see that the system eventually must change.
Public policy and private actors have tried to respond.  But 
today’s health-care system provides no incentive to individual 
doctors and patients to pursue cost-efficient medicine.  Ac-
cordingly, the United States has a discouraging 30-35 year 
history of espousing and adopting simplistic and partial 
“solutions”on top of a fundamentally flawed system.  We have 
had a long procession of “band aids” in health care, each of 
which was supposed to solve, or significantly mitigate, our 
problem of uncontrolled health-expenditure growth.  Some of 
these contained germs of good ideas, and some of them would 
have figured prominently in a rational comprehensive solution; 
but none of them came close to addressing our fundamental 
problems.
The basic problem has been and remains that the whole 
health-care financing system rests on inflationary founda-
tions.  The incentives and the organization of health care 
work against affordable care.  Medicare is predominantly fee 
for service.  In the private employment sector, most employ-
ees have been locked into fee for service (formerly indemnity 
insurance, now PPOs) without a choice.  Health expenditures 
are now dominated by the cost of caring for people with 
chronic conditions, but the traditional system does not provide 
the financial foundation on which the infrastructure of chronic 
disease management can be built.  Our traditional health-care 
system is oriented toward acute episodes, not ongoing care 
for people with chronic conditions. Our current systems flaws 
are exacerbated when people change jobs (which is happening 
increasingly frequently) and must change both health insurers 
and providers as well.  Few employers offer employees choices 
of delivery systems, and if they do offer a choice, they often 
systematically pay more on behalf of the more costly plans (of-
ten fee-for-service plans) than on behalf of the less costly plans 
(usually integrated-delivery systems).  Both of these employer 
practices deny employees the opportunity to save money 
and pay lower premiums by choosing less-costly health-care 
systems.  There was and is little understanding of the basic 
problems of incentives and organization.  Indeed, in the 1970s, 
most people thought that financial incentives and organiza-
tion were irrelevant to health care.  Legislatures and citizens 
were reluctant to address the fundamental problems and eager 
to find painless incremental solutions – veritable “band aids.”  
Here is a list of some of them, in roughly chronological order:
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Waste, fraud, and abuse (WFA) was the perceived villain of 
the year in 1972.  Hence, the solution would be more lawyers, 
inspectors and penalties for fraud.  WFA is still present on 
a large scale more than 30 years later.  It received honorable 
mention in the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement 
and Modernization Act of 2003.  The very structure of the 
traditional model invites WFA.  Harvard’s Malcolm Sparrow 
characterized fee-for-service as “a license to steal.”1  Action 
against WFA has had some successes; but rapid health-care 
cost growth continued.  (If the problem of our health-care sys-
tem truly were outright fraud and abuse, it would be relatively 
easy to solve, because it would require only the identification 
and apprehension of a comparative few practitioners whose 
motives were outright greed.  Unfortunately, the problem is 
far more complex, involving well-intended behavior within a 
system that provides every incentive for over-utilization, and 
no incentive for cost-consciousness.)
Then the problem was identified as excess capacity, so the new 
“big thing” became Certificate of Need (CON) laws and health 
systems agencies to prevent building of unnecessary capac-
ity.  These measures failed because incentives to match capac-
ity to need were not present.  The regulators could not stop 
building in the teeth of the economic incentives to do more 
with the facilities that already existed.  If a doctor believed 
that a marginal test or procedure might provide some benefit, 
however small, to a patient, and the facilities to provide that 
test or procedure were available, the facilities would be used 
– therefore demonstrating the “need” for those facilities, and 
the “need” to build more.  Studies showed CON had no effect 
on overall spending.2
President Nixon then imposed price controls.  But experience 
showed that the doctors made up for lost income by increasing 
volume.  The system imploded in complexity over the require-
ment that regulators use due process and just compensation.  
“Just compensation” becomes a fair rate of return, which 
becomes cost reimbursement; and providers have the ultimate 
power to increase costs by providing more services.  
President Carter wanted price controls on hospitals but could 
not get them enacted.  Hospital and medical associations op-
posed these measures vigorously.  One of their proposed alter-
native weapons against cost growth was “the voluntary effort” 
(“the VE”).  Providers of health care would solve the problem 
by voluntary action.  The voluntary effort had no lasting effect. 
Next the problem was identified as an excess utilization of ser-
vices, and the answer became Utilization Review and Profes-
sional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs).  These were 
local non-profit physician cooperatives that were supposed to 
detect overuse and admonish over-users.  That failed, because 
there was no incentive for local doctor groups to curtail local 
spending when so much of the money came from elsewhere.  
A dollar saved in Palo Alto was a dollar returned to Washing-
ton.3  Why would anyone in Palo Alto want to do that?  More-
over, and probably more importantly, meaningful standards 
of appropriate utilization, based on medical evidence and 
persuasive to doctors, simply did not exist.
Then the Congress created Peer Review Organizations 
(PROs) – contract police forces to challenge utilization.  They 
failed, partly for the same reasons as PSROs.  It is hard to sec-
ond-guess the doctor’s care for the patient, especially after the 
fact, and especially if one is not a doctor caring for similar pa-
tients.  Cost-efficient medicine requires a system that involves 
the doctor prospectively – not merely a set of rules, or worse 
still a single reviewer, imposed upon him or her after the fact.  
Then came what could have been an important part of a 
genuine solution, the Health Maintenance Organization 
Act of 1973.  A key point is that it was focused on refinement 
of delivery systems in search of greater cost-efficiency.  At 
the time, the leading alternative modes of organization were 
group practice HMOs and individual practice HMOs.  In 
those days, “HMO” referred to a delivery system, not just to an 
insurance contract.  The fatal flaw of the legislation was that 
it failed to create the market conditions of widespread cost-
conscious individual consumer choice so that there would be 
a market for cost-effective care.  That is, the vast majority of 
individual health-care consumers either did not have a choice 
of a more-efficient, less-expensive health-insurance plan, or, 
if they had the choice, did not themselves save any money by 
choosing the more-efficient system.  The reason was that many 
employers fulfilled the HMO Act’s legal requirement not to 
discriminate against HMOs by paying the same 80 to 100 
percent of the premium of the plan of the employee’s choice, 
whether it was fee for service or HMO.  This deprived HMOs 
of the opportunity to market cost-effectiveness, because the 
employee would save either nothing (if the employer paid 100 
percent of any premium) or only 20 percent (if the employer 
paid 80 percent) of the difference by choosing a lower-priced 
HMO.  Thus, HMOs helped, but they failed to achieve their 
potential because employers and government failed to create 
a market for them.  Policymakers simply assumed that there 
would be a market for economical health care without careful 
examination of employer practices.  The HMO Act should 
have been accompanied by more-fundamental and far-reaching 
reform of the EBI system, but there was neither the vision nor 
the felt need at that time.
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The Prospective Payment System (PPS) for Medicare for hos-
pitals was a logical and significant step toward a more econom-
ical health-care system, improving incentives for hospitals by 
requiring them to accept responsibility for managing at least 
a significant piece of the cost.  It was a big success for a while.  
However, it was limited to inpatient care, and much care 
escapes the limits on inpatient services; and it did not include 
physician inpatient services (which Holland has included 
for some years).  In addition, it did not reward prevention of 
inappropriate care, or prevention of the need for hospitaliza-
tion in the first place.  The latter point is especially important.  
Over half of all Medicare patients are now treated for five or 
more chronic conditions.  This problem is growing rapidly 
(in 1987, 31.0 percent of beneficiaries were treated for five or 
more chronic conditions; in 2002, it was 50.2 percent), and is 
responsible for virtually all of the Medicare spending growth 
(in 1987, beneficiaries with five or more chronic conditions ac-
counted for 52.2 percent of all Medicare spending; in 2002, it 
was 76.3 percent).4  Persons with (or at risk of acquiring) sev-
eral chronic conditions need far-more-coordinated treatment 
and counseling than is provided by the traditional medical 
model, under which the patient chooses to see the doctor only 
when symptoms arise.5  Although PPS was successful on its 
own terms, the problem of unsustainable growth of Medicare 
is very much still with us.
In the early 1980s, “competition” became the “Magic Bullet,” 
but the government and employers did not make the changes 
in the market to assure cost-conscious consumer choice of 
delivery system, and so competition did not happen.  President 
Reagan advocated “free markets,” and dismantled ineffec-
tive regulation, but did not take the steps necessary to create 
a functioning market of competing delivery systems.  His 
administration even let expire the provision in the HMO Act 
that employers must offer choices of HMOs, which had at 
least encouraged some competition among different modes of 
organizing care.  In addition, the administration turned down 
strong recommendations to cap the exclusion of employer 
contributions for health insurance from employee taxable in-
come.  Somehow, the notion of “competition” was based on the 
unrealistic belief that what happened in the health-care sector 
was actually the product of the free market.  
Then Congress adopted the resource-based relative value scale 
(RBRVS) governing Medicare fees for doctors, in a sense 
expanding PPS from the hospital segment of the program to 
apply more broadly.  Like PPS, this was a good idea as far as 
it went.  It was an attempt to create a rational basis for Medi-
care fees, to take excess profit out of some services, especially 
procedures, and to assure adequate payment for evaluation 
and management services.  However, Medicare is still fee-for-
service, and doctors increase volume to protect themselves 
from loss of income when fees are cut.  (In fact, Medicare has 
an office whose mission is to estimate the volume response to 
fee cuts.)  In any case, government simply cannot set all of the 
hundreds, or even thousands, of prices at efficient levels; and 
government controls can turn such prices into political prizes.  
In the 1990s, many had great hopes for “managed care,” which 
promised an improved mode of organization of medical care.  
However, much of what was offered was essentially insur-
ance companies or “carrier HMOs” marketing the services of 
fragmented, uncoordinated, fee-for-service doctors, without 
reorganizing the delivery system, and doing so under a com-
prehensive care contract characteristic of HMOs.†  As under 
traditional fee-for-service medicine, the doctors wanted to 
do everything they could for their patients, and the patients 
wanted anything that might help them; so the insurance 
companies found themselves in the uncomfortable position 
of standing between wanting patients and willing doctors.  A 
backlash followed because employers forced many people into 
“managed care” without a choice, without visible sharing of the 
savings, and without much explanation of what was happening 
or why.  
People, understandably, want to be able to choose their doc-
tors.  They do not understand why their employers should 
make that choice for them.  HMOs select doctors.  Therefore, 
people must be allowed to choose their HMOs, or any other 
plan that limits their choices of providers, or whether to be 
in and HMO at all.  Research showed that the dissatisfaction 
with managed care was concentrated among people who were 
assigned to it without a choice.6  To assign people to HMOs 
without giving them a choice is to invite a backlash. Many 
HMOs were forced to have a very wide all-inclusive network.  
Managed care was reduced to FFS in states with “any-willing-
provider” laws.  Managed care was not allowed to “interfere” 
with the way medicine was practiced and it was not allowed to 
select providers.  If managed care is forced to mimic FFS, there 
is no way for it to innovate and develop systems different from 
† Some of the “carrier HMOs” were mostly only about restraint, not about reorganizing care, though some, like Prudential, actually built a delivery system of 
group practices, and others like Health Net, PacifiCare, Blue Shield and Blue Cross of California contracted on a per capita prepayment basis with existing 
Multi Specialty Group Practices that were willing to accept responsibility to manage care and costs.
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FFS.  There is also no reason to expect that it can sustain any 
significant cost reduction.  
Why One Current Big Idea – The 
Consumer-directed Health Plan – Will 
Not Work
President Bush and some in the Congress have favored High-
Deductible Health Plans, also known as Consumer Directed 
Health Plans (CDHP).  In some presentations, this approach 
is billed as something close to a complete answer for the 
problems of the nation’s health-care system.  Some firms have 
introduced plans along these lines.  Will these plans help to 
close the gap between NHE growth and GDP growth?
It is good that firms have used the CDHP model to obtain 
coverage for their employees who hitherto have had none.  
CDHP coverage clearly has value.  However, we are skeptical 
that CDHP will prove to be the solution to the deterioration 
of employer-based insurance, and to the unsustainable growth 
of health-care costs.
Fundamentally, CDHP is not one variation on existing main-
stream health insurance, but a combination of two.  It is help-
ful to analyze those two parts separately, and then to consider 
the implications of putting them together.
Consumer Direction.  Many experts have argued for some 
time that consumers must accept more responsibility for their 
health, including both managing their habits (diet, smoking, 
alcohol, exercise) and choosing their providers and treatments.  
Consumer-directed health plans generally assume an increased 
measure of such responsibility relative to conventional insur-
ance.  The assumed increased consumer involvement in medi-
cal-care choices is probably the more critical element.
To some degree, this assumption probably is based on the 
computer revolution.  CDHP anticipates that, as in other 
phases of life, consumers will use the Internet and other 
information resources to make more-cost-efficient choices in 
health care: in this instance, shopping for the cheapest pro-
vider, learning about the implications of alternative treatments 
and therapies, and so on.  CDHP calls for providers to release 
comprehensive information on their quality and prices.  That 
would be incontrovertibly desirable, but it would require a 
major change from current practice.  The availability of a com-
puter-based health record would facilitate the heightened con-
sumer responsibility.  First recommended in the Institute of 
Medicine report, “Crossing the Quality Chasm,” this advance 
gives the consumer access to and control over his or her entire 
life-long medical record.  Such records generally do not now 
exist.  The coming evolution of consumer choice of treatments 
and therapies, and the opportunities surrounding personal 
computerized health records, are both uncertain.
This kind of information could be used to plan health care 
under any kind of insurance policy.  Would it work to control 
costs in a CDHP?  Consider the other element in this model.
High-Deductible Health Insurance.  CDHPs require the 
insured to pay the first dollars (usually $1,000 to $2,500) of 
health-care expense (that is, the “deductible”) before the insur-
er begins to pay the bills.  Some CDHPs are associated with 
health savings accounts (HSAs), which are tax-deferred, and 
which can be used to pay for the care below the high deduct-
ibles associated with the policy.  In some instances, the em-
ployer makes deposits into the HSA for the employee, either 
independently or as a match; in other instances, the employee 
alone is responsible for funding the HSA.  Unspent balances 
in HSAs can be rolled over from year to year without tax, and 
can be withdrawn without tax to pay medical expenses.  (If 
withdrawn for non-medical purposes, the withdrawals are 
subject to income tax plus a 10 percent penalty.  If the balances 
are not used until the owner becomes eligible for Medicare, 
the 10 percent penalty is waived.  If the owner passes away, the 
balances can be bequeathed to the individual’s heirs, and the 
10 percent penalty is waived.)
The rationale for CDHPs is that the incentive of the high 
deductible will induce the consumer to economize on health 
care; after all, it is the consumer’s money.  Having the HSA is 
expected to mitigate any cost problems in meeting the deduct-
ible for consumers of modest means.  Many CDHPs waive the 
deductible for preventive care, which is supposed to encourage 
consumers to keep close tabs on their health.  
Thus, putting the two elements together, the result is some-
what analogous to the shift from a defined-benefit pension 
plan to a defined-contribution plan.  Under conventional 
health insurance, individuals undertake less risk (and can 
choose to have less responsibility for their treatment choices), 
and pay higher premiums so that others take on those respon-
sibilities.  Under CDHP, individuals are at risk for the deduct-
ible, and might be expected to be more involved in treatment 
choices for that reason, while paying a lower premium in 
exchange for taking those responsibilities on themselves.
In other words, consumers would be expected to engage in 
preventive care; and then, when illness or injury strikes, to use 
the latest information technology to find the most economical 
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and efficient therapies and treatments, to minimize spending 
under the CDHP deductible, and to protect the balance in 
their HSAs.  In this way, it is claimed, total health-care costs 
would be brought under control.
Is this outcome likely?  There are several reasons to be skep-
tical.  First, it is unlikely that health-insurance deductibles 
in the realistic $1,000 to $2,500 per year range (any higher 
amount would likely force many families without employer 
contributions to HSAs, with modest incomes, and with health 
problems to go without care) would exert any meaningful 
leverage to reduce total health-care costs.  It certainly would 
be desirable for people to know the quality of medical services 
and what they cost, and to have some personal reason to care. 
This would probably be the case to the degree that they had to 
shop and pay for the first $1,000 to $2,500 of annual expen-
diture.  However, health expenditures are very concentrated 
on relatively few people.7  In 2002, as noted in CED’s previous 
statement, 80 percent of health expenses were incurred by 
people with costs exceeding $3,219.  Thus, in any given year, 
well over 80 percent of health expenditure dollars will be spent 
on people who have exceeded their deductibles or can safely 
expect to do so (for any level of deductibles that is reasonable).  
Recalling that 83 percent of health expenditures are on people 
with one or more chronic conditions, many people with chron-
ic conditions will expect to reach their deductibles.  Certainly, 
anyone who has been an inpatient in a hospital, or is likely to 
enter a hospital, will have reason to believe that he or she will 
exceed any insurance deductible.8  For those who expect they 
will exceed their annual deductibles, the marginal cost of more 
care will be small, probably zero – depending on whether 
their plans involved co-payments, which are usually relatively 
small percentages, for spending above their deductibles.  In any 
event, the marginal cost will certainly not be enough to affect 
their decisions once they are hospitalized.  The RAND experi-
ment to test coinsurance found that once people were hospital-
ized, coinsurance had no effect on spending.9
Second, once CDHP enrollees have reached their deduct-
ibles, they will be in effect in fee-for-service medicine – to be 
precise, usually in wide-access PPOs, which are fragmented 
uncoordinated FFS arrangements.  There is no expenditure 
restraint in such systems, only incentives to give and receive 
more care.  Some have argued that once consumers had built 
the habit of shopping for price within the amounts of their 
deductibles, they would continue to try to cut costs even when 
their insurance kicked in at 100 percent reimbursement.  Al-
though it is impossible to rule out such behavior, it is clear that 
there would be no economic incentive for consumers to do so 
– especially given that high health expenditures can indicate 
serious health problems, for which consumers likely would 
want all of the best possible care.
Third, CDHPs appeal most to consumers who have reason to 
believe that they will remain healthy, and thus will be able to 
bank their HSAs.  To the extent that this is true, the risk pool 
for non-CDHP plans will be depleted, shifting costs mainly to 
people with chronic conditions who will not choose CDHPs 
because they would expect to exhaust their deductibles.
CDHPs will be especially advantageous to those who are 
both healthy and wealthy, because they can both afford the 
higher deductibles and take the most advantage of the Health 
Savings Account tax shelter, a new tax break in the Medicare 
Modernization Act of 2003 intended to encourage the choice 
of high deductibles by equalizing the tax treatment of out-of-
pocket spending and spending through tax-favored insurance.  
Employer contributions to HSAs are free of income tax and 
employee contributions are deductible above the line.  The lim-
it on tax-sheltered savings is the deductible in the health-in-
surance plan, up to $5,400 (for married couples) in 2006.  For 
a high-bracket taxpayer, the tax savings on this will be worth 
over $1,900 a year, plus possibly additional savings from state 
income taxes, plus tax free accumulations.  This has created a 
very attractive opportunity to shelter income from taxes.  
Because the HSA is an exclusion from taxable income, the 
tax benefit is most valuable to the best-off taxpayers who are 
in the highest tax-rate brackets (and is worth nothing to the 
worst-off taxpayers who face a zero-percent tax rate).  These 
same well-off persons benefit from the lower premiums and, 
through this device, can escape the pooling of risk with their 
less-fortunate fellow employees.  Favorable selection of risks 
will help CDHP to grow rapidly, while leaving the higher risks 
behind in the standard low-deductible plans.  However, the 
loser may be the fairness of our private health-care financing 
system – not to mention the viability of health insurance for 
those who are not fortunate enough to benefit from CDHPs.  
It is not clear that this approach is based on a realistic concept 
of the problems of health care.
Fourth, about 83% of health-care spending is associated with 
the 133 million Americans who suffer from chronic condi-
tions: hypertension, arthritis, asthma, cancer, heart disease, 
diabetes and its consequences (including renal failure), AIDS, 
etc.10 These persons need to be, in the words of the Institute 
of Medicine (IOM), in “continuous healing relationships” with 
their health-care system.11  We also are now suffering an epi-
demic of obesity, which will lead to many occurrances of heart 
disease, diabetes, etc.12 These costs will ultimately be borne by 
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all of us through Medicare, Medicaid, and disability insur-
ance.  The emphasis in our health-care delivery system needs 
to be on teaching and motivating these patients to change their 
life styles and adopt healthier patterns of behavior, support-
ing them in their efforts, and monitoring their medications 
appropriately.  Health-care organization and finance should 
create the foundation for disease-management infrastructure.  
However, CDHP is based on the idea that a key to economy 
is keeping people away from the doctor.  That might be true 
for acute care in uncoordinated fee for service; but it will not 
be true in our society with so many people having and heading 
toward chronic diseases.  CDHP moves in the wrong direc-
tion—attempting to keep people away from health care rather 
than reaching out to support them in improving their lifestyles 
and managing their conditions to keep them out of the hospi-
tal and away from more costly complications.
To be fair, many advocates of CDHP would exempt preven-
tive care from deductibles and co-pays.  However, to continue 
in fairness, it is by no means clear that such exemptions would 
work in a system whose entire philosophy is to keep people 
away from their physicians.  For example, it is far from certain 
that those who enroll in CDHPs because they cannot afford 
higher premiums, and therefore cannot afford the deductibles, 
will go to the doctor for exempt preventive care when they 
know that they cannot afford any non-exempt treatments or 
therapies that the doctor might recommend.  This could lead 
to under-funding of primary care and prevention, and could 
reinforce the present trend of young American doctors not 
going into primary care.  Primary-care physicians could have 
increased difficulty collecting their bills, because those costs 
would be the ones to which deductibles would most likely 
apply.  Interestingly enough, 22 per cent of large employers 
now offer in-house clinics to their employees to make access 
to the doctor more convenient.13  (Alternatively, advocates of 
CDHPs have expressed concern that common low-deduct-
ible policies have led to overutilization, and yet Americans still 
have underconsumed preventive care.  Should we expect that 
CDHPs will yield more use of preventive care, when their cov-
erage of that care is no more generous than that under current 
low-deductible policies?)
Fifth, CDHP emphasizes the decisions of informed consum-
ers, a model that may seem to fit well with a population of 
professors of management in universities that have medi-
cal schools who have enough free time to keep up with the 
medical literature, but that makes less sense for others.  These 
consumers are supposed to shop confidently for doctors, and 
negotiate with them over prices and treatments.  Medical 
care is very complex and uncertain.  Wennberg’s research has 
documented remarkably wide variations in physician practice 
patterns, reflecting the fact that most doctors do not have a 
very well-informed idea of what is the best thing to do.14  Con-
sidering that only 27 percent of Americans age 25 and over 
are college graduates, it seems unlikely that even much better 
consumer information than we have will drive better decision 
making at the micro level.15 Only recently, the most famous 
bypass graft (CABG) patient in America, William Jefferson 
Clinton, living in the state with the best outcomes-related 
information, chose a hospital with higher than average risk-
adjusted mortality.  His choice arguably did not fit well with 
the CDHP model.  More broadly, the experience in New York 
has been that the publication of such quality-related informa-
tion did not drive changes in market share.  The changes in 
performance apparently came from extra-market forces such as 
state regulation, or the threat of it, and from the professional 
aspirations of doctors and hospital managements and boards, 
most of whom wanted to be among the best.  Arguably, the 
information requirements at the micro-decision level of 
individual providers and treatments are much greater than the 
information needed to make an informed choice of a care sys-
tem.  This suggests that it makes more sense to ask consumers 
to shop in a routine open season for a cost-efficient health-care 
plan, rather than to require them to shop perhaps in a time of 
crisis when they need an expensive and potentially life-saving 
treatment or therapy.†
Why “Single Payer” Like Canada Or 
“Medicare For All” Will Not Solve Our 
Problems With Health Care
Beyond Consumer-Driven Health Plans, another “big idea” 
for health-system reform is a “single-payer” system, of which 
Canada’s is a prominent example.  Many people think that the 
logical replacement for the employment-based system would 
be a Canadian-style system.  That is, at either the federal or the 
state level, government would serve as the single health insurer, 
cover everybody, and pay all the bills according to a govern-
† Physicians in prepaid group practices take part in systems that accept responsibility to manage total per capita expenditure of their enrolled members.  There 
is a great deal of evidence that they do the best job.  They do not appear to be eager to add to patient cost sharing.  They do not believe that unnecessary pri-
mary care visits are driving expenditure growth.  They do want patients with medical problems to come in early and be seen, or at least to call an advice nurse.
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ment-determined or negotiated fee schedule.  (In Canada, hos-
pitals are paid prospective “global budgets.”)  Another way of 
expressing this type of approach is “Medicare for all;” in other 
words, every American would be covered by the Medicare pro-
gram or something very similar.†  The California Legislature 
recently passed a single-payer bill.  Single-payer proposals have 
also appeared as ballot initiatives in California, but they usu-
ally have not fared very well.  That could change, and probably 
will as the consequences of soaring insurance costs play out.
As an alternative in the United States today, this model has 
features with great appeal.  For one thing, everyone is covered 
in the most familiar models.  The complexities of determining 
who is covered, and by which program, are eliminated.  There 
would be a huge simplification of administration.  All provid-
ers would bill the government, or its agent, on a uniform claim 
form and be paid a uniform fee.  In Canada, doctors bill the 
province on a claim form that looks like a credit-card charge 
slip.  Canadians and Medicare beneficiaries have access to 
practically every doctor in the jurisdiction.  (That is chang-
ing now as doctors decline to take new Medicare patients 
in response to Medicare fee reductions.)  There would be 
no network restrictions.  There would be no marketing and 
underwriting expenses of insurance companies dealing with 
many individual employers, because there would be no more 
insurance companies (other than as claims processors or 
vendors of supplemental insurance).  Health insurance would 
be removed as a factor in the labor market.  Employers could 
eliminate their bureaucracies for dealing with health insurance, 
and CFOs could forget about health care (except when they 
paid their taxes).  Altogether, it would be reasonable to expect 
that some 15 to 20 percent of the costs associated with health 
insurance would be eliminated. This includes the costs of 
brokers and agents and the large costs to employers of retain-
ing staffs and consultants to help them manage their health 
coverage purchasing.  
Single-payer models are generally based on fee-for-service pay-
ment because that is the way most doctors are paid.  Depend-
ing on one’s point of view, that would be an advantage or a ma-
jor disadvantage.  It would be an advantage because it would 
be familiar, and administrative processes exist.  Most doctors 
and medical groups are paid that way today and prefer it.  
However, from the point of view of concerns about the or-
ganization of medical care, or lack thereof, and its impact on 
economy and quality, locking in uncoordinated fragmented 
fee-for-service would be a major disadvantage.  It would leave 
in place existing medical organization, with all the deficiencies 
for quality and economy discussed in CED’s earlier reports.  It 
would continue to be oriented to acute episodes – rather than 
chronic disease management, where most of the money is.  It 
would deny us the benefits of any potential new and better-
organized delivery systems.  In sum, all of the organizational 
flaws that have rendered the current system inflationary and 
unsustainable would remain in place.
Fee-for-service solo practice is the most costly form of medi-
cal organization and finance.  As noted above, fee-for-service 
has built-in incentives for delivering volume, not quality.  It 
motivates, or is compatible with, a great deal of over-use, 
under-use, and misuse of services.  As Wennberg’s studies 
comparing Medicare in Florida and Minnesota show, fee-for-
service allows very wide variations in medical practice and 
apparent overuse in Florida.  Patients in the last six months of 
life in Florida get several times as many doctor visits as similar 
patients do in Minnesota, while reporting less satisfaction with 
their care.  Because single-payer systems encourage fee-for-
service medicine, Wennberg’s work shows that government 
would be forced to support the most costly providers in their 
preferred practice style.  
The single-payer model is rigid and extremely hard to change.  
It has proven practically impossible for Medicare to break out 
of fee-for-service, even though Congressional leaders have long 
said that they want to offer choice to beneficiaries.  Medicare 
does offer HMOs, called “Medicare Advantage” plans, but the 
amount Medicare pays to those plans is tied to the prevailing 
risk-adjusted fee-for-service per capita costs in each geographic 
area.  Canada’s Medicare system destroyed their prepaid group 
practices because the dominant payment system left no oppor-
tunity for Canadians to save money by joining more-efficient 
delivery systems.  
There are other problems with single-payer systems.  Perhaps 
the next most important one is the entanglement of pro-
vider payment with politics.  The medical-industrial complex 
already is a huge source of political money.  Medical device 
companies and drug companies employ persons in many 
Congressional districts, either directly or through contractors.  
Every Congressional district has doctors and hospitals.  If all 
of their revenues depended on the government, it would be 
hard to imagine that attempts to influence the allocation of 
funds in the program through lobbying and political contribu-
† There are many alternative ways for government to play a role in health insurance that might be characterized as “single payer.”  The Canadian-style or “Medi-
care for all” approach is the most prominent, and the most widely understood.
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tions would not grow substantially.  Payment by government 
would become, literally, a matter of life and death to health-
care providers.
Some think that a single payer would be able to control health 
expenditures.  However, government today is having a very 
difficult time controlling the costs of its existing health com-
mitments to Medicare (as well as Medicaid and public-em-
ployee health care).  Health expenditures cannot be controlled 
effectively merely by regulating prices.  Expenditures are the 
product of prices and quantities.  Squeezing down on prices 
arguably motivates a “volume response” – that is, doctors react 
to a reduction of prices by increasing the volume of services 
they provide.  Experience with the current Medicare program 
bears this out.16  Congress has created a countermeasure to 
that in the “sustainable growth rate” formula: what the doctors 
take in utilization will be recaptured through lower fees.  Ob-
viously, that is hardly an optimal system.  It punishes the frugal 
along with the prodigal.  It remains to be seen whether or not 
it will be sustained.
Government appears unable to discriminate among providers.  
It is very unlikely that government could refuse to deal with 
providers who appear to be more costly for the results they 
produce, as long as some beneficiaries – that is, voters – de-
mand them.  Already, under the current system, Medicare’s 
attempts to offer a better deal for patients going to regional 
centers of excellence for complex care have foundered.  Non-
discrimination by any payer is a principle the provider organi-
zations fight for.  
Government cannot “just say no” to costly new technologies.  
In fact, Congress will not even allow the administrators of 
Medicare to consider costs in relation to benefits in decisions 
of whether or not to cover new technologies for Medicare pay-
ment.  There is strong evidence that competing private health-
care delivery systems can do a much better job of cost-effective 
deployment of new technologies, and targeting them to where 
they will really be effective.17 
Government simply cannot know how to set so many and 
such complex prices, taking account of local market conditions. 
Congress must and does use across-the-board rules for setting 
prices, which are very hard to change.  For example, Medicare 
has created a boom in cardiology procedures by overpaying 
for them and making them more profitable than other kinds 
of care.18  This in turn is leading to a boom in heart hospitals, 
which the Congress is now seeking to inhibit.
Canada is suffering from long waiting times from primary 
care referrals to specialist treatment.  Global budgets do not 
create incentives for efficiency. The proper incentives could 
lead to the amelioration of the problem.  It is interesting that 
the British are moving in the direction of market models and 
incentives reform.  
In short, for all of its appeal, the single-payer model suffers 
from serious, probably fatal, weaknesses.  Although other 
nations with single-payer systems spend smaller shares of 
their GDP on health care than the United States does, those 
shares are rising just as inexorably.  Measures of dissatisfac-
tion with single-payer systems abroad are growing, just as they 
are with our system.  Moreover, our own single-payer systems 
– Medicare and Medicaid – already have their own problems 
(which are not solely assignable to their responsibility for the 
elderly and other groups with disproportionately ill health).  
CED concludes that a single-payer system would not solve 
our health-care problems – and in fact may make them even 
worse.
Many Other Current Favorite Ideas 
Are Being Oversold As Solutions In 
Themselves; Others Would Not Work
Consumer-Driven Health Plans and single-payer health 
systems are probably the two biggest “big new things” in the 
dialog on health reform.  However, there are many other popu-
lar ideas that are smaller in scope.  Some would have positive 
effects, but are often oversold as total answers to the health-
care cost problem – which they are not.  Other ideas would 
have no favorable effect, or even would be retrograde.  These 
ideas are the successors to the “band aids” of the 1970s, 1980s, 
and 1990s.
One idea that has generated much excitement is Information 
Technology.  This seems like a safe course for politicians to fa-
vor.  It has glitter and does not apparently threaten any impor-
tant interests.  In fact, information technology will surely be an 
indispensable component of any reformed, modern, high-qual-
ity delivery system, which is why the major integrated-delivery 
systems are spending billions to roll it out in their practices.†  
† Veterans Administration Health System, Kaiser Permanente, the Mayo Clinic, and the Palo Alto Clinic, among others, are leaders in the development and 
application of health IT.  
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However, merely superimposing a veneer of IT on top of the 
current mal-constructed health-care system will not solve the 
underlying problems.  IT will not do much good if the delivery 
system is not reorganized by redesigning care processes to take 
advantage of it.  In a fundamentally dysfunctional and disorga-
nized delivery system, IT may end up just giving an inefficient 
system an electronic means of communication to automate 
inefficient practices.  IT is being ascribed magical powers; but 
one perceptive analysis pointed out that the deployment of IT 
is not in the interest of the doctors, hospitals, and laborato-
ries in the uncoordinated FFS sector.  This probably explains 
why it is being adapted so slowly there.19  To illustrate, con-
sider that a well organized solo primary-care practice has no 
particular need for IT for itself, though it could be a valuable 
tool for the doctor to use in managing chronic disease patients. 
The real benefit from IT adoption in that office would accrue 
to the health-care system as a whole, through better informed 
specialists to whom the patient is referred (fewer wasted visits, 
more productive visits, less time lost on history taking or 
tracking down lost information), better coordination between 
the specialists and the primary care physician, and fewer lost 
and/or duplicated test results.  However, these “benefits” to 
“the system” would not be benefits to individual FFS physi-
cians who would experience less revenue from fewer visits and 
tests.  In addition, the primary-care practice itself would bear 
all of the costs.  Given the circumstances, it is no wonder that 
there is slow or no adoption of IT in the solo-practice FFS 
sector.  (Some might mandate the adoption of IT.  This would 
raise the same questions as all other government mandates; 
and adoption would surely be halfhearted, if there were only 
compulsion and no positive incentive to make the system truly 
work.)
Comprehensive Electronic Health Records (EHR) would be 
an important output of health IT, and a foundation of efficient 
integrated-delivery systems.  Prepaid group practices kept 
longitudinal comprehensive records from the outset, and are 
now converting them to electronic form.  They are potentially 
very important, and they could be very helpful for quality and 
efficiency, but they will not make fragmented fee-for-service 
affordable.  They may be defeated by the unwillingness of 
FFS doctors to expose their work to competitors who might 
criticize it.  It is not clear that EHR will do much good in the 
uncoordinated fee-for-service small-practice sector.
Pay for Performance (P4P) was started in California by the 
Integrated Healthcare Association as a way of getting all the 
carriers participating in the California Delegated Model, and 
contracting with physician organizations that were willing 
to bear risk for resource use, to use the same quality metrics 
for preventive services and patient satisfaction as the basis for 
bonus payments.  Among other things, P4P could establish 
a single measure of practice quality, and get away from the 
confusing “dueling report cards.”  Its main limitation is that it is 
based largely on process measures and not on medical out-
comes.  (It would be difficult to execute P4P on a risk-adjusted 
basis using health outcomes.)  P4P makes sense in its original 
context because the physicians are already willing to accept re-
sponsibility for managing resource use.  But now, P4P is being 
interpreted as something that might help limit expenditures 
in the uncoordinated fee-for-service context.  In fact, it might 
even increase costs.  There needs to be a fundamental shift to 
a market that is based on responsible consumer choice and 
competition among physician organizations to produce value 
for money.  In that context, performance information can be 
helpful to consumers.  
With the prominence of costly chronic conditions, Disease 
Management (DM) could be an important contributor to 
health care.  It is, of course, an integral part of prepaid group 
practices, whose financing provides both the incentive and the 
financial platform (through the capitated prepayment) for suc-
cessful disease management.  In contrast to the close fit with 
prepaid group practice, disease management must be tacked 
on to fee-for-service, which lacks both the incentive and the 
financial platform.  Now, with DM being promoted as another 
effort to overcome the fragmentation of fee-for-service, it is be-
ing offered as an optional program to consumers and has a low 
uptake and low follow through.  Recent data suggest savings 
are low.20  Disease management is potentially very important.  
It should be integral to the health-care system, not patched on 
from the outside.
Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) is an attempt to synthe-
size the scientific literature and to combine it with analysis 
of detailed health records to determine which treatments 
work under which circumstances, and to steer the practice of 
medicine toward those treatments.  It is important because it 
could improve care, reduce medical uncertainty and unwanted 
variations, and might save money.  However, the success of 
EBM is not guaranteed.  There need to be incentives to prac-
tice it, monitoring systems to make it happen, and incentives 
to choose economical guidelines.  Research showed that mere 
publication of guidelines had no effect on physician behavior.  
Tort Reform could help reduce expenditures and is surely well 
worth doing on its own merits.21  Research by Kessler and Mc-
Clellan suggests that, at least in the case of fresh heart attacks, 
reform could save five to ten percent if there were any incen-
tive to reduce expenditures.22  And five to ten percent is surely 
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significant.  However, this may prove to be a one-time change 
in the level of expenditures, with no long-term reduction in 
their growth rate.  
Tiered High Performance Networks (THPN) are an inter-
esting idea: use claims data on all services associated with each 
episode of care (usually acute care) to ascribe the management 
of the episode to a physician (usually a specialist), and then to 
sort out high-cost and low-cost physicians.  The ideal would 
then be to route all patients to high-quality low-cost physi-
cians.  This approach is promising, but has some distinct limi-
tations.  THPN obviously is designed as a cost-saving device 
for individual employers or insurers; it has much less relevance 
to attaining system-wide savings.  (Some might suggest 
superimposing THPN on a single-payer system.  However, 
that would be totally contrary to the experience of Medicare, 
under which policymakers have zealously guarded the right of 
every patient to choose any physician.)  There are data analysis 
issues, such as the accuracy of assigning every episode to one 
physician, and of correcting for innate differences among the 
patients and the episodes.  In addition, THPN will do little 
good if employers are unwilling to create sufficient financial 
incentives to induce patients to switch to economical doctors.  
Perhaps most importantly, because it is focused on special-
ists and acute-care episodes, the methodology ignores the 
important roles of primary care and prevention.  Tiered high 
performance networks could end up with high volumes of 
preventable inappropriate episodes; even if they were handled 
efficiently, this would not solve the cost problem.  THPN 
could do more good if plan designs gave people real incen-
tives to choose economical doctors; and still more good if plan 
designs were connected with a strong system for primary care 
and prevention, in which motivated primary-care physicians 
used the data to guide their patients to quality cost-effective 
specialists and to oversee the appropriateness of procedures.  
Transparency is also cited as a potential solution.  Trans-
parency is an attribute of all well functioning markets.  The 
current health-care manifestation of transparency is the idea 
that consumers, not just insurance company or medical group 
managers, who have some reason to act on the information, 
should know what hospitals charge.  Of course, purchasers 
who are using their own money or their company’s money 
need to know the cost of the things they are buying.  Con-
tracting between insurance companies and providers is now 
a well developed, if imperfect, art.  However, one wonders 
what the ordinary insured consumer with a $2,000 deduct-
ible is going to do with that information.  The doctor says ,“I 
must admit you to the hospital.”  The consumer thinks, “There 
goes my $2,000! Now bring on the technology:  More scans.  
More tests.  Do anything that might conceivably help me.”  
Mere $2,000 deductibles are not going to make patients price 
sensitive about hospital costs.  If people have reason to believe 
they are likely to reach their annual deductibles, as would be 
the case with pregnancy, a costly chronic condition, or any 
hospitalization, there will be no cost-reducing incentive from 
deductibles.  Moreover, much higher deductibles are likely to 
make care unaffordable for average-wage people.23
This history of “band-aids,” and the latest successors, should 
make it clear that there are no easy, simple reforms, things 
that sound good and have popular appeal, that would solve 
the health-care problem.  All of these examples are attempts, 
sometimes useful, sometimes not, to bring spending under 
control without doing the “heavy lifting” of reforming the 
market.  Excess expenditure growth is too fundamental, too 
pervasive, and is driven by forces that are too powerful for any 
superficial changes to make a meaningful difference.
In contrast, in an efficient health-care market, all consum-
ers would have informed cost-conscious choices of delivery 
systems (so that cost-effective delivery systems would pros-
per and have serious incentives to improve efficiency, quality 
and service).  This informed cost-conscious consumer choice 
would drive the market toward economical delivery systems 
that could address issues such as alignment of the incentives of 
providers with the interests of patients in high-quality afford-
able care.
Characteristics Of A Health-care 
Financing And Delivery System That 
Could Respond To America’s Needs: What 
Should We Demand And Expect?
If the single-payer or consumer-directed approaches will not 
solve the problems of high levels of expenditure and growth 
(not to mention poor quality and poor disease management), 
what will?  As we have seen, there are no easy or simple solu-
tions.  Unfortunately there are no guarantees.  The nation can-
not simply decree a reduction in reimbursements for health-
care providers.  That would discourage the supply of health 
care, and as has been the case in stop-gap reimbursement cuts 
in the federal Medicare program, doctors and hospitals would 
respond by performing more individual services to maintain 
their total billing amounts.  The nation cannot decree that 
there will be some arbitrary limit to the volume of medical 
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services provided; that could prevent the delivery of needed 
services.  An arbitrary halt to the development of medical tech-
nology would prevent the discovery of cost-reducing, as well 
as cost-increasing, treatments and therapies, and would inhibit 
innovations that would benefit people enormously.  And there 
are no clear models from overseas; recall that all the industri-
alized countries are facing similar unsustainable expenditure 
growth rates, though from much lower levels of spending than 
ours (measured as percentages of GDP).  Thus, there likely is 
no strategy that would yield a precisely measurable, accurately 
predictable amount of savings to limit the growth of health-
care costs.
However, there are some serious possible changes that might 
make a large difference and, in the long run, move the system 
in a desirable direction.  The heart of the issue is competition 
to serve cost-conscious buyers, and incentives for providers 
to create and run high-quality, but affordable, health-care 
systems.  
Competition motivates innovation and efficiency improve-
ment.  For virtually the entire non-health-care economy, 
over the history of the nation and even before, competitive 
pressures have increased quality and tempered prices.  The 
improvements have occurred in ways that could not be 
predicted in advance.  Consumer choices have signaled price 
standards and preferred product and service attributes to the 
marketplace, and suppliers have improved their processes and 
methods to meet and then to surpass those standards, thereby 
setting new ones.  Even given the unique nature of health care, 
some elements of competition provide the best hope for a 
more cost-efficient health-care system.  
What would a competitive system do?  Clearly, we need a very 
fundamental change that would give almost everybody a seri-
ous personal interest in seeking and choosing an economical 
health-care delivery system.  The earlier discussion of CDHPs 
expressed doubt that consumers could drive health-care ef-
ficiency by shopping for lower prices for individual treatments 
and therapies for serious illnesses.  However, consumers could 
have meaningful influence on the health-care market by shop-
ping in a more deliberate fashion for cost-efficient health-care 
financing and delivery plans.
This is not unheard of in this country.  The University of 
California offers employees a range of choices including both 
FFS and group practices, with a fixed-dollar contribution set 
at the premium (risk-adjusted) of the low-priced plan.  In 
this arrangement, every consumer can benefit financially from 
choosing a lower-priced plan, and the low-priced plan can 
protect its market share by maintaining or widening the gap 
between its premium and those of its competitors.  Employees 
make their choices at an annual enrollment at which the prices 
are displayed side by side, and switching plans is made easy.  
Under these conditions, 81 percent of the employees have 
chosen the lower-cost group-practice-based HMOs.  At Wells 
Fargo Bank in California, with a similar model, the enroll-
ment in low-cost group-practice-based HMOs is 78 percent.  
(These are not cheap or bare-bones “plan designs,” but rather 
comprehensive coverage associated with large multi-specialty 
physician organizations that are committed to economical 
use of resources.)  The Federal Government does something 
similar for its employees (though the federal design has some 
technical deficiencies that impart an inflationary bias, and pre-
miums are not risk-adjusted).  Fifty-eight percent of Federal 
employees in California have chosen the same HMOs.  
Under these systems, employee cost-conscious choice raises 
the market share of the most-efficient providers, and motivates 
the others to try to reduce costs to maintain their competitive 
positions.  Unfortunately, only a small percentage of employees 
are in such models now.  As explained earlier, most employers 
do not offer choices, and many of those that do offer choices 
systematically subsidize the more costly plans (by contribut-
ing a fixed percentage of the total cost for whatever plan the 
employee chooses).  This leaves a large cost-unconscious sector 
in which generally cost-inefficient FFS providers can survive.  
What modicums of competition there are in the current sys-
tem have motivated many doctors who prefer the FFS practice 
style to form Independent Practice Associations (IPAs) that 
include management controls and enable them to compete.  
What is needed is for essentially everyone (possibly excepting 
the very elderly, the disabled and a few other groups) to receive 
a defined contribution and some choices.
What would the successful delivery systems under such an 
approach look like?  The brief and definitive answer is, no one 
knows.  Just as competition has produced unpredictable results 
in every other industry, so it would in health care.  In fact, the 
answer would change constantly, because the process of inno-
vation and improvement would never stop.  Thus, the object of 
health-system change is not to anoint any one delivery model 
from today’s landscape as the definitive answer, but rather to 
unleash the forces of competition to work their unpredictable 
will.  Because the outcomes of competition are unpredictable, 
in time, the apparently successful systems might even be sig-
nificant improvements of models that today appear outdated, 
 Part Two – The Options
or alternatively might be models that do not yet exist.  The 
one thing that is certain is that the systems that succeed in a 
fair competitive environment will be those that best meet the 
needs of the population at large.
Despite the uncertainty, there are some reasonable general 
statements that can be made on the basis of delivery systems 
that appear more efficient within today’s health-care sector.  
These are based on the apparent requirements for a system 
that would respond to America’s needs, and also some attri-
butes that seem likely to be favored by the competitive process 
at this time.  These characteristics would amount to a major 
innovation, and a fundamental transformation of the health-
care delivery system:
• Health Promotion and Disease Prevention:  Emphasize 
primary care, disease prevention and early detection and 
treatment, to address the current epidemics of chronic dis-
eases.  It will take a great deal more than the health-care 
delivery system to reverse these epidemics: public-health 
measures, school-based programs, work-site programs and 
more are needed.  Nevertheless, it certainly could help a 
great deal if the health-care delivery system, with all its 
resources in intelligent well-educated personnel, technol-
ogy and money, were clearly oriented in the direction of 
improving the health of the population.24
• Management of Chronic Disease:  Create the infrastruc-
ture for chronic disease management and support it fi-
nancially.  Improve care management for chronic diseases. 
This includes monitoring patients, adjusting their medica-
tions in a timely and appropriate manner, educating them 
on their conditions, and how to do their part in manag-
ing their diseases.  Appropriately trained non-physician 
personnel can do much of this work.  
• Develop more humane alternatives than the acute inpa-
tient setting for end-of life care.
• Efficiency:  Align the incentives of providers with the 
needs and wants of the American people for high-quality 
affordable health care.  That could mean salaried physi-
cians with significant bonus payments for quality, patient 
satisfaction, efficiency and teamwork in at least some of 
the competitors.  Select and train physicians and other 
health professionals for quality and willingness to work in 
teams, with programs to be sure they are proficient, well 
informed and up to date.  Train non-physician personnel 
to maximize the services they can perform appropriately, 
reserving physicians for where they are needed.  Deploy 
health professionals in the appropriate numbers and spe-
cialties needed to care efficiently for enrolled populations.  
Correct specialty imbalances.
• Continually evaluate and redesign work processes to 
improve efficiency and take full advantage of IT.  (The 
integrated-delivery systems are far ahead of the traditional 
FFS sector in deploying HIT.  It is apparent that the ben-
efits of HIT—reducing the need for hospital days, doctor 
visits and diagnostic tests—are not in the interest of 
individual providers in the FFS sector.25)  Keep continu-
ous, comprehensive, longitudinal medical records, analyze 
them and feed the results back into practice improvement.  
Follow patients over time and learn what works and what 
does not.  Deploy and use health information technology 
to create caregiver support tools such as shared compre-
hensive electronic health records, guidelines, prompts, and 
reminders, to monitor performance and to take correc-
tive action, where appropriate, to assure optimal care.  
McGlynn et.al.  recently documented that Americans are 
receiving just over half of recommended care.26  Errors of 
omission are widespread.  Caregiver support tools, com-
bined with organization and incentives, could ameliorate 
this greatly.27  Make Continuous Quality Improvement a 
way of life.
• Match all resources used to the needs of the population 
served.  Select equipment that has been properly evaluated 
for safety and effectiveness, and deploy it in appropriate 
numbers for proficiency and economies of scale.  Create 
training programs to be sure personnel are expert in its 
use.  
• Integrate and coordinate services through the continuum 
of care, at home, the doctor’s office, and the hospital inpa-
tient and outpatient settings.  Deliver care in the least-
costly appropriate settings, considering total system costs, 
not just costs and revenues associated with one setting.  
(Integrated-delivery systems can engage in such planning 
in a way that is impossible for disaggregated providers.)  
Create smooth transitions and hand-offs so that patients 
leaving one setting are not lost when they transfer to an-
other, so that their outpatient providers are well informed 
on their inpatient care, and vice versa.
• Concentrate complex care in regional centers of excellence. 
Delivery systems may create their own centers, or subcon-
tract the work to centers outside their systems, based on 
rational “make-buy” calculations.  
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• Enact a rigorous policy to prevent conflicts of interest in 
treatment and procurement decisions.
• Innovation and Technology for Efficiency:  Manage the 
huge flow of medical information.  (Over 10,000 random-
ized trials are published each year.)  This is beyond the 
reach of solo or small group practitioners.  A system must 
translate this information into up-to-date science-based 
best-practice guidelines and make them conveniently 
available to doctors.  Physicians with a serious interest in 
economical practice should develop these guidelines.  This 
would speed the transition from scientific discovery to 
medical practice.  This is being attempted by a consortium 
of medical groups in Minnesota called the Institute for 
Clinical Systems Improvement, and also by the Kaiser 
Permanente Care Management Institute.  The Veterans 
Health Administration has a similar program called the 
Quality Enhancement Research Initiative.  Such pro-
grams, combined with monitoring and feedback, should 
be able to help greatly in reducing the medical uncertainty 
underlying the very wide variations in medical practice.  
• Back off of “flat-of-the-curve” medicine (that is, practices 
in which the marginal benefit in health outcomes is very 
small and uncertain relative to the cost).  Evaluate new 
technologies and use them selectively only where evidence 
supports that they are beneficial to patients.
• Tackle the problem of technology assessment, including 
cost-effectiveness or value for money in actual practice 
over time, and not just in controlled trials.  Create a legal 
framework that can permit health insurers to offer policies 
that do not cover some technologies because of cost, to 
help make their programs more affordable.  This will be an 
exceedingly difficult problem, but there may be no long-
term success without addressing it.  At the same time, we 
must be careful not to shut down valuable life-saving in-
novation.  We will also need legislative changes to facilitate 
market entry by companies that want to create and market 
generic substitutes of very costly biologics once the patents 
held by the original developers have expired.
• Genomics offers exciting opportunities for better care and 
also large challenges to the health-care system.  There are 
hundreds of genetic tests now available, some quite costly.  
Genomics offers opportunities to diagnose people at high 
risk of disease and to develop targeted therapies.  To use 
these resources wisely and effectively, there will be a need 
for organized systematic approaches, including evaluation 
of who should be tested, and what prevention strategies 
and therapies they should be offered.  A satisfactory sys-
tem must be structured to organize this effort effectively.
In its important report, Crossing the Quality Chasm, the IOM 
put forward a shorter list that is well worth considering care-
fully.†
If all this were to happen, we would have a radically different 
health-care delivery system from the one we have today.  Yet 
each of these expectations is reasonable on its face.  Reflection 
on the difference between these reasonable requirements and 
where we are in health care today tells us how far we have to 
go.  Yet none of this is more than what one would reasonably 
expect from a well-run world-class competitive company in 
any other industrial sector in the economy.  
We also need very broad risk pools, because some treatments 
that society seems unwilling to deny to those who need them 
have become extremely costly.  Risk-spreading among compet-
ing delivery systems can be accomplished by risk adjustment 
and reinsurance for very-high-cost cases.
This transformation of health-care practices cannot be im-
posed by the government, top down, or even by employers.  It 
would be very difficult to define such a system in legislation.  
Nobody knows exactly what the best system for health-care 
delivery is, or what it will become as health technology con-
tinues to evolve.  Nevertheless, the market forces of informed 
cost-conscious consumer choice can drive the transformation.  
Within these specifications, there is a lot of room for adapta-
tion for different cultures, geographic circumstances, and the 
like.  The best delivery systems are those that can survive in a 
competitive market.  
We also need humane coverage: coverage that is comprehen-
sive (protecting everyone from severe financial hardship re-
lated to medical expenses); and coverage that is secure, so that 
people do not lose their coverage when they lose their spouses 
or change their jobs, divorce, become sick, or retire before age 
† Washington, DC 2001.  The paragraph headings of their list were: 1.  Care based on continuous healing relationships.  2.  Customization based on patient 
needs and values.  3.  The patient as the source of control.  4.  Shared knowledge and the free flow of information.  5.  Evidence-based decision making.  6.  
Safety as a system property.  7.  The need for transparency.  8.  Anticipation of patient needs.  9.  Continuous decrease in waste.  10.  Cooperation among clini-
cians.  The ideas are completely compatible with the CED report. 
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65.  We need the right of people to stay with their preferred 
delivery system as long as they do not move out of its service 
area.  Insecurity of coverage is a major problem in our health-
care economy today.  So is churning.  Many people are just a 
layoff away from economic insecurity because of uncovered 
health-care costs.  Financing today is fragmented with each 
payer seeking to shift costs onto other payers. This is a costly 
and unproductive effort.  
Radical as all this is, it may not be enough to solve our prob-
lem.  We also need a more vigorous and effective anti-trust 
policy including breaking up any regional provider monopolies 
created by mergers whose only purpose was to achieve market 
power.
Could all this solve the problem of the unsustainable growth 
rate?  There is no guarantee, just as there is no guarantee with 
any other system; and the underlying rapid growth rate of 
the elderly population, who are disproportionately in need of 
health care, without a doubt will increase the rate of growth of 
costs.  But it is reasonable to suppose that the system reforms 
outlined here could reduce the level of health expenditures.  
Given the range of premium costs among different modes of 
delivery at this time, it is not out of bounds to imagine that the 
level of costs could be cut by as much as half.  The motivation 
of a continuous program of cost-reducing innovation would 
appear to be our best chance for an acceptable way of coun-
terbalancing the expenditure-increasing effects of expanding 
technology, and thereby reducing the rate of growth of costs.  
Furthermore, a delivery system seriously focused on disease 
prevention and management might be able to mitigate signifi-
cantly the cost consequences of the proliferation of chronic 
conditions.  
How Might We Get There?
As was noted above, there is an existing model of what the 
whole market for health-care financing and delivery could 
look like in the choices presented to a University of California 
employee: a reasonable set of good-quality competitors, with 
available information on quality and patient satisfaction, and a 
responsible financial choice (i.e.  the University pays the price 
of the low-priced plan, and the employees who want a plan 
that costs more pay the difference).
A similar suggestion that has been made by some prominent 
elected officials from both parties is to use the Federal Em-
ployees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) as a model for 
everyone.  The FEHBP offers employees and retirees a wide 
range of choices and a semi-fixed-dollar employer contribu-
tion.  The FEHBP is a large and nationwide system and serves 
as a good metaphor, although it has several significant design 
deficiencies that ought to be corrected, either for serving its 
existing population, or for a national model.†
The result might be called “market-based universal health 
insurance” (M-B UHI).  It includes two essential elements:  
First, individuals must have choices of alternative health 
insurers and providers, who are free to use alternative delivery 
system models.  Individuals should be provided with fixed-dol-
lar defined contributions, which should equal the cost of the 
low-priced plan that meets comprehensive standards (such as 
in the case under the University of California and the Federal 
Employees Benefits plans; only quality plans with broad cover-
age may compete).  If an individual chooses to buy a more-
expensive option, he or she must pay the difference.  Thus, 
individuals save if they choose more-economical plans.
† Specifically:  (1) The employer contribution amount is not a fixed-dollar defined contribution.  It is set at 70% of the average premium of some of the largest 
plans.  But if a plan were to come in with a premium lower than the contribution amount, the employee choosing the plan would get to keep only 25% of the 
savings.  That amounts to a 75% tax on efficiency and a strong disincentive for any plan to come in with a premium below that average.  Of course, that tends to 
drive up the average.  The Congress should provide that if any plan offers a premium below the average (subject to a limitation mentioned next), the employee 
choosing it gets to keep 100% of the savings.  (2) The program ought to specify a standard uniform minimum package that all plans must cover, but let com-
petitors come down to that standard if they want to.  Establishing a standard minimum package would help to prevent problems of adverse selection (if, for 
example, one plan were to offer coverage for fertility treatments while another did not, the former systematically would attract some very expensive risks).  (3) 
There ought to be risk adjustment of premiums using state-of-the-art risk-adjustment methods, analogous to what is done in Medicare Advantage.  (4) Instead 
of national uniform pricing that does not take account of regional differences in the cost of doing business, there ought to be regional pricing.
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Second, those choices should be made available through 
health-insurance exchanges, which pool large numbers of indi-
vidual risks and spread administrative overhead so that small-
business workforces can participate.  Issuance must be guar-
anteed, so that everyone can obtain insurance.  The exchanges 
should require standardized policy “fine print;” distribute 
information about plans, including their quality and perfor-
mance; and facilitate individual choices and switching among 
plans during periodic open-enrollment periods.  They should 
risk-adjust premiums – so that costs are spread equitably over 
the whole population, to maintain incentives for plans to enroll 
and care for sick people, not to avoid them; and to avoid the 
instability caused by spirals of adverse selection.  As a part of 
this process, exchanges could create regional reinsurance pools 
for very-high-cost cases or conditions.
This design would focus competition on value for money in 
the informed best judgment of consumers, and not in any way 
pick winners and losers in advance.  The competitive market 
would do that, over time.  The system should encourage differ-
ing delivery modes, to encourage competition and innovation.  
It should include plans with fee-for-service organization and 
wide choices of physicians, so that those who currently use 
such systems and want to continue to do so can stay with what 
they know and like.  In the end, some existing models might 
be winners in the competitive marketplace, or the winners 
might be entirely new, as-yet-unimagined models.  One thing 
would be for sure:  The outcome would be different from what 
has gone before because the incentives and opportunities for 
consumers to make economizing choices would be radically 
increased.
These broad outlines, even with two real-world examples, leave 
important questions of implementation.  One of the examples 
is public, and one is private.  Which mode should be chosen?  
If it is the private (University of California) model, why is it 
that this successful model has not spread on its own?  What 
changes in public policy would be needed to scale such a model 
to national implementation?  The private model is based on 
employment.  How could that approach be implemented to 
achieve broader or even universal coverage, to attack the prob-
lem of the uninsured?  And if the public model should be cho-
sen, what would be the cost, and how would it be financed?†  A 
forthcoming CED statement will examine these choices.
Potential Alternative Delivery Systems
Many people find it hard to imagine health-care financing and 
delivery systems other than the dominant uncoordinated, “free 
choice” fee-for-service small-practice system.  This system is 
hard to change, and its adherents fairly successfully fought off 
the “managed care” revolution of the 1990s.  To imagine how 
different insurance might be, it is important first to imagine a 
world in which every individual or household has an annual, 
cost-conscious choice among alternative financing and deliv-
ery systems in a model structured to make sure their choices 
are informed and easy to make.  (This is a state of affairs that 
exists, for example, for employees at the University of Califor-
nia and Stanford University, Wells Fargo Bank and Hewlett 
Packard, and Federal and California State Employees, but oth-
erwise only in a small minority of employment groups.)  How 
would things be different if health insurers had to compete for 
members, not employers?
Experience shows that people would migrate to what they 
perceive to be value for money.  This might not be the cheap-
est plan; but it would be the plan that people decide to be the 
best combination of price and all other attributes that they 
value.  For such a system to work, the number of choices must 
be manageable for typical consumers.  (The experience of 
employers with 401(K) retirement plans is that some of their 
employees become overwhelmed when confronted with too 
many options.)  On one key dimension, however, it is likely 
that consumers will have to trade off price against choice: 
plans that have constrained integrated networks of providers 
will probably be cheaper than those that allow unlimited selec-
tion.  Thus, consumers would have a choice between delegat-
ing the management of their health care at a lower price, versus 
becoming responsible for that management in all of its detail 
– or some combination in between.  It would be important 
that consumers be offered the option of a free-choice fee-for-
service plan – so that every person who is satisfied with his 
or her health care could keep what he or she had.  However, 
in the interest of value for money – and in particular financial 
savings – it is likely that some consumers would choose health 
plans with limitations on choice of provider that they would 
not have accepted if they could not choose the limited group 
of physicians – if it had been imposed by their employers, and 
especially if that imposition did not include visible receipt of 
the attendant financial savings.
† One plan along these lines has been introduced in Wisconsin by a bi-partisan pair of legislators and can be seen at www.wisconsinhealthproject.org.
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One of the most important insights is that there is very wide 
variation in practice patterns among physicians, and the most 
cost-effective physicians often achieve the best outcomes by 
“doing it right the first time.”  A key step toward a quality cost-
effective health plan is selection of a limited set of providers.
It is impossible to forecast which systems would prosper in a 
reformed truly competitive market for health plans.  The fol-




The major health-insurance companies have been devel-
oping extensive analyses of databases to identify quality 
cost-effective doctors and to be able to separate them from 
doctors who are of high cost and poor quality.  Insurers 
usually find quite a few who are in the favorable quadrant 
of the quality and efficiency space, using total cost per epi-
sode to measure efficiency.  The general idea would then 
be to offer health plans, usually in a PPO format, that 
would require substantially higher customer cost sharing 
if the customer goes to other than the designated quality 
cost-effective doctors.  As mentioned in the body of this 
statement, there are data analysis issues, such as the ac-
curacy of assigning every episode to one physician, and of 
correcting for innate differences among the patients and 
the episodes.  In addition, there are concerns that employ-
ers might be reluctant to use plan designs that include 
powerful incentives to make people change doctors.  Also, 
because this methodology is focused on specialists, where 
most of the money goes, it ignores the important roles of 
primary care and prevention and appropriateness of care.  
THPNs could end up with high volumes of preventable 
inappropriate episodes; even if they were handled effi-
ciently, costs per person might be high.
The weaknesses of THPNs might be addressed by 
pairing them with Capitated Primary Care Networks 
(CPCNs).  Starting in the late 1970s, HMO of Penn-
sylvania, later U.S.Healthcare, developed a network of 
selected primary care physicians who were committed to 
the concept of cost-efficient medicine, who would be paid 
on a per capita payment basis for all primary care services, 
and who would accept extensive quality measurement.  In 
addition, they would share in the savings, if any, in a bud-
geted pool of money for specialist services.  This model 
grew rapidly and was very successful, enrolling more 
than one million members.  It was eventually acquired by 
Aetna, which apparently no longer uses it because it does 
not fit well with Aetna’s “single-source” business model.  
Nevertheless, such a Capitated Primary Care Network 
could build in the important functions of health educa-
tion, early detection, disease management and manage-
ment of referrals to cost-effective doctors.  In addition, 
it could grow rapidly because it uses doctors already 
established in practice.  The effectiveness of the HMO of 
Pennsylvania model was limited by the lack of the kind of 
data needed to identify the most efficient doctors.  
It is not hard to imagine how such a model could evolve 
toward greater integration as the primary care doctors 
and the health plan could invite the specialists with the 
best records of performance and cooperation to join their 
system.  Eventually these models could become more and 
more like multi-specialty group practices.  
2.	 Individual	Practice	Associations
In the 1970s, doctors in traditional practice in counties 
that also had strong Prepaid Group Practices formed 
Individual Practice Associations (IPAs) through their 
county medical societies.  The idea was to preserve the 
traditional model in a format that would allow the FFS 
doctors to offer the financial equivalent of Prepaid Group 
Practice while preserving their individual or small practice 
style.  The IPA would be paid capitation, but the doctors 
would be paid fee-for-service.  IPAs reconciled the differ-
ence by imposing management controls on their physician 
members, and usually withholding payment of some 20 
percent of fees until the end of the year, and then paying 
out what was left if there was a financial surplus.  Many 
IPAs failed financially in California in the 1990s, often 
because they lacked the commitment of their participat-
ing doctors and because the fee-for-service incentives were 
too strong.  Many doctors considered IPAs to be “just an-
other insurance company.”  An important weakness of the 
IPA was its lack of selectivity.  It could not trade volume 
for price or protect its surgeons from the surgeon surplus 
(or otherwise correct specialty imbalances) because all 
the doctors in the county not in prepaid group practices 
belonged to the IPA.  Another significant weakness was 
anti-trust risk, as it was often not clear what distinguished 
an IPA from a price-fixing agreement among doctors.  
However, the leading IPA in Northern California, Hill 
Physicians Medical Group, caring for nearly 400,000 
members, has survived and prospered in an environment 
where there are strong multi-specialty medical group 
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practices.  They contract with the major network HMOs 
on terms similar to those of the multi-specialty group 
practices.  They have more than 3,000 physicians and 
other providers in more than 1,300 practices.  They are 
rolling out an Electronic Medical Records solution that 
will make comprehensive patient records available to par-
ticipating physicians.  In 2005, they paid out $26 million 
in performance bonuses for physicians.  They are deploy-
ing other electronic systems to assist their physicians 
with appointment setting, patient eligibility, claims status, 
electronic claims processing, etc.  They have the benefit of 
strong and effective management.
Tufts Health Plan in Massachusetts serves over 560,000 
members. The plan works with hospitals and hospital 
staffs.  To align incentives and to compensate them for 
revenue loss through reduced hospitalization, hospitals 
receive a portion of the savings from those reduced hospi-
talizations, preserving what would have been their small 
“profit” and fixed overhead portion, but not incurring the 
significant variable costs.
IPAs could have a strong future if they could attract the 
loyalty, commitment and responsible participation of 
physicians, if they could be selective of physicians in order 
to address specialty balance and teamwork, and if they 
could achieve a high degree of virtual integration through 
shared electronic medical records and electronic systems 
for administration, such as for appointments and pay-
ments.  Their evolution would need to be in the direction 
of improving efficiency through better integration.  
3.	 Prepaid	Group	Practices
A prepaid group practice (PGP) is an integrated entity 
that includes both a health-care delivery system (doctors, 
other clinicians, laboratories, clinics, and hospitals) and an 
insurance function (financing arrangements, benefit plans, 
marketing and customer service systems) “under one roof.” 
Critical components of the PGP include the following:
 • A multi-specialty group practice – that is, a group of 
clinicians, including primary care generalists, non-
physician providers such as nurse practitioners, and 
specialist physicians – sharing finances, facilities, 
equipment, and responsibility for all enrolled mem-
bers and committed to the team practice of medicine;
 • Any hospitals or other facilities owned by or affiliated 
with the multi-specialty group practice;
 • A voluntarily enrolled population that contracts with 
the PGP through a sponsor (employer or public pro-
gram) or as individuals;
 • Comprehensive health-care services provided directly 
or indirectly by the PGP;
 • Per capita prepayment;
 • Accountability for the quality and cost of the care that 
is delivered;
 • A relationship (usually, but not necessarily, mutually 
exclusive) between the delivery system and the insur-
ance entity.  
PGPs now cover roughly 12 million people.  The main 
examples of PGPs are Kaiser Permanente, now operat-
ing in nine states and the District of Columbia; Group 
Health Cooperative of Puget Sound; Health Partners in 
Minnesota; and Health Insurance Plan (HIP) of New 
York.  Harvard Community Health Plan was a PGP until 
it merged with Pilgrim to become a mixed group/IPA 
model.
Properties and attributes of Prepaid Group Practice in-
clude the following:  Physicians are paid salaries, depend-
ing on their specialties and market conditions, and usually 
substantial bonuses for measured patient satisfaction, 
indicators of quality and teamwork.  This facilitates incen-
tives alignment.  The culture emphasizes teamwork and 
shared responsibility for enrolled patients.  PGPs empha-
size primary care, disease prevention, early detection and 
treatment of disease, and chronic disease management.  
The model facilitates development of the infrastructure 
for chronic disease management, and also provides a 
smooth way of transferring savings from the inpatient 
sector to the ambulatory-care sector that prevents the 
need for hospitalization by superior care for patients with 
ambulatory-sensitive diagnoses.  They feature longitudinal 
comprehensive medical records and analysis of practice 
patterns and outcomes, to determine what works best in 
practice.  Prepaid group practices are among the leaders in 
the adoption of health information technology.  
In the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, a ran-
domized controlled trial, Group Health Cooperative 
in Seattle delivered care of equal quality for 28 percent 
fewer resources than fee-for-service practices in Seattle. 
They accomplished this in the absence of competition in 
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kind from similar delivery systems and, for the most part, 
premium-price-sensitive customers.  
4.	 Large	multi-specialty	group	practices	evolving	
toward	PGP
Should the market and consumer choices lean in that di-
rection, the 175 multi-specialty group practices that have 
over 100 physicians now existing in the United States 
could evolve toward larger integrated systems by having a 
portion of the practice prepaid.  In 2005, these practices 
included 81,600 physicians.  While higher concentra-
tions of these entities exist on the Pacific Coast, upper 
Midwest, Florida and New York, at least one exists in all 
but three states.  Clinics from Boston, New Hampshire 
and Vermont could reach out to serve people in Maine, 
etc.  Many of these are quite famous, including the Mayo 
Clinic; the Ochsner Clinic; the Leahy Clinic; the Fallon 
Clinic; Marshfield; Scott and White; Virginia Mason; 
Henry Ford Hospital, and many more.  Many of these 
have their own affiliated health plans now, although that 
activity has been receding in the face of unfavorable mar-
ket conditions.  Others have had their own health plans in 
the past, and others, such as Leahy, have teamed up with 
a Blue Cross or Blue Shield carrier to produce a joint ven-
ture product when they thought market conditions were 
receptive.  All could be marketed through network-model 
carrier HMOs like PacifiCare and Health Net – a move 
more plans could offer without major start-up costs.  
If a model of universal health insurance based on com-
petition to serve cost-conscious consumers were enacted, 
most or all of these group practices, and perhaps some 
smaller ones as well, would find it in their economic 
interest to create their own health plans again, or team up 
with established carriers to create joint-venture partner-
ships for “private-label products” (like the Blue Cross 
Leahy health plan).  One main reason for this is that 
the per capita prepayment that comes with having their 
own health plan facilitates realization of many efficien-
cies not available in FFS, such as the smooth transfer of 
resources from the inpatient sector to outpatient disease 
management programs (because the disease management 
programs reduce the need for hospitalizations), as well as 
reduction in the need to engage in fee-for-service billing 
and collection.  That is, cost reductions would not be ac-
companied by reductions in revenue as they usually are in 
FFS.  In the market conditions hypothesized here, these 
entities could grow rapidly, and that growth could trigger 
innovation on the part of all other providers.  
These innovations could move much more quickly if their 
access to customers were not filtered through employers.  
Numerous other promising ideas that surfaced and were 
tried in the late 1980s and early 1990s might be tried 
again in more favorable market conditions.
5.	 Roles	of	Academic	Health	Centers
Leaders of academic health centers (AHCs) have often 
felt themselves to be threatened by the prospect of com-
petition, and have expressed opposition to the creation 
of a truly competitive health-care economy.  What would 
be their roles in a model of market-based universal health 
insurance?  Here are some possibilities.
Of course, their unique roles would be teaching and 
research.  The products of these services are public goods, 
which are and must be subsidized at their appropriate 
value, by government.  AHCs also now often provide a 
great deal of care to the uninsured poor.  To some extent, 
this is subsidized by Disproportionate Share payments.  
With universal health insurance, the need for this would 
be greatly reduced, but nevertheless present.
Some Academic Health Centers would find it in their 
interest to create comprehensive care programs based on 
per-capita prepayment to compete in the general market 
for health insurance.  This usually would not be their core 
competence.
Probably all Academic Health Centers would compete for 
regional referrals for complex care from the region’s sup-
pliers of comprehensive care.  This happens today as many 
Academic Health Centers provide organ transplants, neo-
natology, and “quarternary care” in the grey zone between 
ordinary care and research.  (Think of heart surgery in 
utero.)  These logically would be financed by negotiated 
global condition-based payments per case.  And finally, 
AHCs would compete in the market for “destination 
medicine” in which patients in need of their care will 
travel even great distances to receive it.  The Mayo Clinic 
comes to mind.  This might be on a fee-for-service basis, 
or negotiated global condition-based payments.
The next CED statement will describe a market-based 
system of universal health insurance in more detail, and 
will map out a practical transition from where we are to 
sustainable and more-efficient medical care.
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